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Using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data on young men, we estimate the long-
term effects of youth unemployment on later labor market outcomes.  A spell of 
involuntary unemployment can lead to sub-optimal investments in human capital among 
young people in the short run.  A theoretical model of dynamic human capital investment 
predicts a rational “catch-up” response to such a spell.  Using semiparametric techniques 
to control for the endogeneity of prior behaviors, our estimates provide strong evidence 
of this response.  We also find evidence of persistence in unemployment.  Despite the 
catch-up response, however, we find the negative effect of prior unemployment on 
earnings to be large, to be persistent and to taper off slowly over time.  The theoretical 
model predicts each of these three effects.  Combining our semiparametric estimates with 
a dynamic approximation to the lifecycle, we find that unemployment experienced as 
long ago as ten years continues to affect earnings adversely. 
                                                          
¤ Department of Economics, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and The Carolina Population 
Center.  Email: tom_mroz@unc.edu. 
∗ Charles River Associates.  Email:  tsavage@crai.com. 
 
We are grateful to Donna Gilleskie and David Guilkey for their valuable comments on prior drafts of this 
paper.  We thank Brian Surette for his FORTRAN programs.  Tetyana Shvydko provided excellent research 
assistance.  Many useful comments on earlier drafts came from seminars at Duke, UNC, the Stanford 
Institute for Theoretical Economics, the World Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the 
University of Iowa, and Yale.  The Employment Policy Institute provided partial funding for this research 
project. 
 1
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The long-term effects of youth unemployment on later labor market outcomes are 
critical factors in the evaluation of government policies that affect the youth labor market.  
Adverse impacts may take the form of lower levels of human capital, reduced wage rates 
and weakened labor force participation in the future.  If these adverse effects are large 
and persist through time, policies such as raising the minimum wage or increasing 
unemployment benefits could have sizeable but hidden costs.  Most analyses of the 
potential impacts of labor market policy, however, focus only on contemporaneous 
employment effects.  This focus may be quite shortsighted, particularly for young people. 
 This research presents policy-relevant estimates of the effects of youth 
unemployment on labor market outcomes later in life.  We jointly model the endogenous 
schooling, training, and labor market decisions and outcomes of young men over time 
using a sample from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79).  The 
econometric framework used in this study includes detailed controls for the endogeneity 
of a wide range of human capital behaviors, including prior unemployment. 
A spell of unemployment can lead to sub-optimal investments in human capital 
among young people in the short run.  A general dynamic model of human capital 
investment and accumulation predicts a rational “catch-up” response to an involuntary 
unemployment spell.  The estimates presented here provide strong evidence of this catch-
up response.  We find that recent unemployment has a significant positive effect on 
whether a young man trains today.  While there is little evidence of significant long-lived 
persistence of unemployment spells on the incidence and duration of future 
unemployment spells, there is short-term persistence. 
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Despite this catch-up response and an absence of long-lived persistence in 
unemployment spells, there is evidence of long-lived “blemishes” from unemployment.  
Dynamic simulations using our approximation to the lifecycle optimization process 
indicate that a six-month spell of unemployment experienced at age 22 would result in an 
eight percent lower wage rate, on average, at age 23.  This wage effect occurs whether we 
“assign” unemployment to all working individuals in the sample or if we use increases in 
local unemployment rates to induce those most at risk of layoff into unemployment.  The 
former scenario represents a “population average” effect, while the latter is a form of a 
local-average treatment effect.  Wages remain over five percent below their non-
disturbed level through age 26, and even at ages 30 and 31 wages are two to three percent 
lower than they otherwise would have been.  In 2002 US dollars at 2,000 hours per year, 
a six-month spell of unemployment at age 22 yields a $1,400 to $1,650 earnings deficit at 
age 26 (about six percent) and a $1,050 to $1,150 deficit (about four percent) at age 30, 
depending on the type of average effect one considers.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections.  The next section 
examines the existing literature on the long-term effects of youth unemployment.  The 
third section presents a simple analytic model of human capital accumulation that yields 
several interesting propositions about unemployment, training and potential earnings.  
The fourth section presents an empirical framework to analyze this issue and the data 
used in this study.  The fifth section discusses the estimation results derived from the 
empirical model.  The sixth section concludes. 
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II.  PRIOR LITERATURE 
 Between 1969 and 1979, the unemployment rate of young people age 16 to 19 in 
the US had risen by over 30% from 12.2 to 16.1 percent.  At the time, policy-makers 
feared that the nation was gripped by an unemployment problem that would 
“permanently scar” the unemployed young.1  Therefore, early empirical analyses of the 
long-term effects of youth unemployment focused on the extent to which early 
unemployment spells affected the incidence and duration of future spells.2  These 
analyses found evidence of strong persistence in unemployment.   
In contrast, later studies drew a distinction between true state dependence and 
unobserved heterogeneity.3  Hypothesizing that individuals differ in certain unobserved 
characteristics, these studies demonstrated that a failure to control for heterogeneity 
might spuriously indicate causal persistence.  If such characteristics are correlated over 
time, measures of state dependence act as proxies for this serial correlation in the absence 
of suitable controls.  Young people with weak preferences for work, for instance, will 
tend to work less over time other things equal.  Observed variables such as prior 
unemployment are, therefore, statistically endogenous in regression analyses, and 
unbiased measures of their effects on future spells cannot be obtained. 
                                                          
1 Policy-makers accorded much less importance, however, to the fact that the labor force participation rate 
for this age group had also risen considerably from 49.4 to 57.9 percent.  To contrast the 16.1% rate in 
1979, the US unemployment rate for 16- to 19-year-olds was 18.5% in May 2003, which is three times 
higher than the rate of the above-20 population.  For black teenagers, the unemployment rate was over 37% 
at this time. 
2 See Stevenson (1978) and Becker and Hills (1980).  These studies viewed youth unemployment as 
involuntary.  They predicted dire consequences for those young people who experienced unemployment 
early in their working lives.  On the other hand, dual labor market theorists held that early unemployment 
would permanently track young people into jobs with low pay and little room for advancement.  Drawing 
on the human capital models of Ben-Porath (1967) and Blinder and Weiss (1976), other analyses posited 
that early spells would deprive the young of labor force experience during that portion of the lifecycle when 
it yields the highest return.  As a result, the lifetime earnings profiles of unemployed youths would 
permanently shift down. 
3 See Heckman (1979), Heckman and Borjas (1980), and Flinn and Heckman (1981). 
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 A 1982 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) volume on the youth 
labor market approached the subject of youth unemployment, in part, by drawing on the 
search-theoretic framework of Mortensen (1970) and Lippman and McCall (1976).  
Many of the analyses in this volume posit that an extensive process of mixing and 
matching among workers and firms characterizes the youth labor market.  Young people 
change jobs frequently due to low reservation wages and low opportunity costs.  High 
turnover rates, possibly punctuated by unemployment spells, are a natural characteristic 
of this market and, as such, are not a source of concern.4 
Within the context of this analysis, three of these papers require further 
discussion.  First, Corcoran (1982) examines persistence in employment status by 
examining whether current employment status is influenced by prior employment status.5  
She finds the odds that a young woman works this year are nearly eight times higher if 
she worked last year than if she did not.  Corcoran also examines the effect of prior 
education and work experience on hourly earnings, finding that both positively affect 
wages for the first few years out of school.6  Second, Ellwood (1982) examines 
persistence in employment patterns using annual weeks of unemployment and annual 
weeks worked.7  After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity with a fixed-effects 
specification, he finds no persistence in unemployment and slight evidence of persistence 
in work behavior.  He also examines the effect of prior education and work experience on 
hourly earnings, finding that both have a significant and positive effect for the first few 
                                                          
4 See Freeman and Medoff (1982), Freeman and Wise (1982), and more recently Topel and Ward(1992). 
5 With a sample of young females from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women, she uses the 
Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional logit model.  Chamberlain (1984, pp 1274-1278), however, notes that 
this specification is not consistent in this context because it assumes that there is no occurrence 
dependence, which is exactly what Corcoran is measuring. 
6 The sample is young women from the Population Study of Income Dynamics who have finished school. 
7 The sample is young males from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men.   
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years out of school.  In both the Corcoran and Ellwood studies, the cost of forgone 
participation appears to be lower future wages rather than persistent nonparticipation in 
the labor market.8  Third, using normal maximum likelihood methods to control for 
endogeneity, Meyer and Wise (1982) jointly model the choices of schooling and annual 
weeks worked.  They also jointly model the schooling decision and wages.  They find 
that hours of work during high school positively affect weeks worked after graduation 
and that early labor force experience positively affects wages.  They jointly model only 
two of the several outcomes of interest, however.  While they recognize that schooling, 
experience and wages should be modeled and estimated jointly, they leave this task to 
future research.9 
 There are several other papers that fit within the context of this research.10  
Michael and Tuma (1984) examine the labor market effects of early labor force 
experience.11  Regressing wages and schooling on lagged experience, they find that early 
employment does not affect wages or schooling likelihood two years later.  They treat 
early experience as exogenous, however, and do not control for possible unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Ghosh (1994), who treats early decision-making as exogenous, also 
                                                          
8 If unobserved tastes vary as young people age, however, neither of these studies controls appropriately for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  Variables such as schooling or prior unemployment remain endogenous, and 
estimates of their effects on outcomes such as hourly earnings are biased.  Furthermore, evidence (Lewis 
[1986] and Robinson [1989]) indicates that the fixed-effects specification exacerbates problems of 
measurement error in a manner that biases estimates toward zero. 
9 Since their data omit high school dropouts, young people for whom early unemployment may have large 
effects later in life, their results could under-state the true long-term effects of early unemployment.  
Further, recent Monte Carlo evidence (Mroz and Guilkey [1992] and Mroz [1999]) indicates that the 
normality assumption, when invalid, often induces greater bias than ignoring the endogeneity in models of 
the type used by Meyer and Wise. 
10 See also Lynch (1985), Lynch (1989), Narendranathan and Elias (1993), Raphael (1996), and the Report 
on the Youth Labor Force by the US Department of Labor (2000). 
11 The sample is 14- and 15-year-olds from the NLSY79.  While this age range may appear quite young, 
they note that a quarter of the male sample works on average 12 hours per week. 
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examines the effects of early labor force experience.12  Using proxies such as test scores 
to control for heterogeneity, he regresses hours worked and wages at ages 22 and 23 on 
early schooling and experience and finds that early experience has positive long-run 
effects on hours worked and wage rates.  In a subsequent NBER volume on the youth 
labor market, Card and Lemieux (2000) hypothesize that young people adapt to changes 
in labor market conditions in a variety of ways.13  They find that weaker labor market 
conditions and lower wages increase the likelihood that young men stay at home with 
their parents, as well as remain in school.  Their hypotheses, however, are not ultimately 
tied directly to a formal model of optimization under uncertainty.  Burgess, Propper, 
Rees, and Shearer (2003), using British data, find that the impacts of early career 
unemployment on later employment outcomes varies according to an individual’s skill 
level, with the lesser skilled being more prone to suffer adverse consequences later in life. 
 A number of studies have used information on displaced workers to examine the 
consequences of layoffs on subsequent wage rates and earnings.  Nearly all of these 
studies find substantial effects for older individuals, whereas the longer-term adverse 
effects tend to be more moderate for younger individuals.14  Topel (1990) in particular 
found more complete convergence in the wages of younger displaced individuals when 
compared to their non-displaced counterparts.  
 In a study of the impacts of displacement on young people, Kletzer and Fairlie 
(2003) use NLSY79 data and find that the wage gap between displaced and non-
                                                          
12 His sample is 14- and 15-year-olds from the NLSY79.  He specifies a recursive system whereby labor 
force participation (either a dummy variable or actual average hours of work) is influenced by exogenous 
characteristics and unobserved ability.  Participation and unobserved ability affect the level of schooling, 
which in turn influences hours worked and separately wages at age 22 and 23. 
13 The US sample is from the Current Population Survey.  The Canadian sample is based on Canadian 
census data. 
14 See, for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).   
 7
displaced men grows through at least five years after displacement.  Their results differ 
from the results that we report here due largely to the fact that the comparison group they 
use, as is done in many other displaced-worker studies, consists of individuals who never 
have experienced a spell of unemployment.  Our economic model and empirical analysis, 
however, examine what would happen if one were able to prevent a single spell of 
unemployment.  As Stevens (1997) demonstrates, much of the estimated persistence in 
low earnings after displacement can be attributed to the fact that the displaced worker 
group can experience multiple spells of unemployment.  For policy purposes, it may be 
more reasonable to ask what would happen if one could prevent a single spell of 
unemployment for a young person rather than asking what would happen if one could 
forever banish unemployment.  
 In summary, much of the current literature on the long-term effects of youth 
unemployment contains potential shortcomings.  These include: the use of small or non-
random samples; the failure to control adequately for unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity; insufficient time horizons to evaluate the full impacts of early 
unemployment; the imposition of unnecessarily restrictive statistical assumptions; the 
lack of a theoretical foundation; and, the absence of specific and meaningful policy 
conclusions.   
This research addresses these potential deficiencies directly.  It uses a large 
sample representative of the young male US population in 1979.  The labor market, 
schooling and training decisions and outcomes of this sample are followed for 16 years.  
We jointly model and estimate these outcomes using a permanent/transitory error-
components specification for unobserved determinants.  This specification controls for 
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the contaminating effects of unobserved heterogeneity, self-selection, and endogeneity.  
We test hypotheses arising from a model of maximizing behavior under uncertainty.  The 
estimates and simulations from this research can help one gauge the long-term impacts of 
policies that affect the youth labor market.  
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III.  A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 Consider the following analytic model of human capital investment. The model is 
similar to Ben-Porath’s (1967) classic model with the addition of random unemployment 
shocks that affect one’s ability to earn and train.15  In this model, the present and the 
future are linked through the process of human capital accumulation.  An exogenous 
shock that perturbs the optimal time-path of human capital investment in one period 
persists through time via its effects on additions to the human capital stock.  The model is 
used to examine the effects of this shock on future behaviors and outcomes.   
 In this model, individuals live with certainty for T periods and may train in each 
of the first T-1 periods.16  For the moment, assume, as in Ben-Porath, that there is no 
unemployment.  At the beginning of period t, an individual’s human capital stock is given 
by tH .  Individuals invest in additional human capital by devoting a fraction of their time, 
ts , to human capital production, which we call training.  Training occurs on the job and 
is considered to be general.  There are no savings, no human capital depreciation and no 
decisions regarding hours of work other than the choice of the fraction of time to devote 
to investments and away from current earnings.  Potential earnings, *tE , could be 
obtained by renting the human capital stock at a constant rate w: tt wHE =
* .17  It is 
always possible to obtain these earnings, except when experiencing involuntarily 
unemployment.  Disposable income (or net earnings) is the difference between potential 
                                                          
15 Ben-Porath uses a continuous-time framework, while the model described here is in discrete time. Unlike 
Ben Porath, we do not allow the human capital production function to exhibit Harrod neutral technical 
change.  See Appendix 1 for a complete presentation of this model. 
16 Because training is costly and there is no future gain, it is optimal not to train in the last period. 
17 As with Ben-Porath, there is an initial positive stock of human capital that is exogenous. 
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earnings and the opportunity cost of human capital used in the production process, or 
ttt wHsE )1( −= .  
At the beginning of each period, an individual chooses the fraction of his time to 
devote to the production of new human capital, ts .  Human capital at the start of the next 
time period is given by )( *1 ttt sfHH +=+ , where 
*
ts  is the actual amount of time that 
ends up being devoted to producing new human capital.  In the absence of 
unemployment, tt ss =
* .  We assume that the production function of human capital is 
increasing in its argument and strictly concave.  These investment choices through time 
yield an optimal time-path of human capital investment and accumulation. 
 We assume that all unemployment is involuntary and that individuals have 
rational expectations about the probability of experiencing unemployment.  The 
probability of unemployment does not depend on the individual’s choice of ts .  All 
training and earnings for each time period take place on the single job chosen at the start 
of the time period (indexed by the value of ts ) before the individual’s unemployment 
status is revealed.  When unemployment strikes, it reduces disposable earnings and 
optimally planned training time on the job by equal percentages.  In particular, let 
)1( λ− be the fraction of the time period that the individual spends unemployed.  If he 
experiences unemployment, then his actual disposable earnings in the time period would 
be ttt wHsE )1( −= λ , and the additions to the human capital stock during the period he 
is unemployed would be given by )( tsf λ .
18  Unemployment, therefore, perturbs an 
                                                          
18 A simple way to conceptualize this setup is to assume that at the start of the “year” an individual chooses 
a job for that entire year that allows him to devote the fraction ts of each working day to producing new 
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individual’s optimal time-path of human capital accumulation by preventing on-the-job 
training. This results in an under-investment in human capital after the unemployment 
spell occurs.  One can view unemployment at time t, then, as an exogenous reduction in 
the amount of human capital available at the start of period t + 1. 
Those who experience an unemployment spell in the preceding period enter the 
current period with a lower stock of human capital than otherwise identical individuals 
who did not experience unemployment.  Crucially, having experienced the shock, 
individuals are able to re-optimize at the beginning of this next time period.  This re-
optimization yields a new optimal time-path of human capital investment.  Besides 
lowering lifetime expected wealth, the only lasting effect of an involuntary 
unemployment spell is that it constrains an individual to a lower human capital 
accumulation than he had planned.  This model, therefore, can be used to examine the 
spell’s effect on future behaviors.  It can also used to examine how a spell affects 
observable outcomes such as earnings and training, and it provides a mechanism through 
which these effects may be mitigated by optimal behavioral responses.  The model 
provides three interesting implications.19 
Proposition 1: The “Catch-up” Response 
After experiencing an involuntary unemployment spell in any period before T-1, an 
individual will unambiguously increase the time that is spent training in the next period. 
 This proposition states that a young person will exhibit an optimal “catch-up” 
response to an involuntary unemployment spell that exogenously reduces his human 
capital acquisition at time t.  An exogenous spell perturbs a young person’s optimal time-
                                                                                                                                                                             
human capital.  If unemployment occurs, the individual loses the latter %100 λ⋅ of the year’s workdays for 
earning disposable income and for producing human capital. 
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path of human capital investment.  Re-optimization that takes the spell into account, 
however, yields a new optimal time-path for the human capital investments.  This re-
optimization produces an unambiguous effect on future behavior: a young person will 
increase the share of time that is spent training.20  We refer to this change in subsequent, 
optimal investment choices as a “catch-up” response. 
Proposition 2: The Convergence of Potential Earnings 
The effect of the unemployment spell on potential earnings diminishes over time. 
 This proposition states that, because of the optimal response to the human capital 
shock, the compensatory training behavior results in a convergence in the unperturbed 
and perturbed human capital stocks.  Therefore, the behavior directly mitigates the 
unemployment spell’s effect on potential earnings over time.  This model demonstrates 
persistence in the sense that the effect of a spell in a single period lasts beyond that 
period.  Optimizing behavior, however, mitigates that effect over time.   
Proposition 3: Excessive Divergence Followed by Excessive Convergence of 
Disposable Earnings 
Observed net earnings immediately after experiencing unemployment are lower than 
would be implied by solely the reduction in the human capital stock. Furthermore, 
observed earnings grow faster after the first period following an unemployment spell 
than would be implied by the convergence of the human capital stocks. 
 This proposition states that, observed differences in disposable earnings between 
those who were and those who were not recently unemployed are larger than would be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 See Appendix 1 for proof of these propositions.  
20 An alternative view of this “catch-up” response is that those who did not experience unemployment had 
acquired  “too much” human capital at time t because they did not become unemployed.  They in turn 
reduce their production of new capital at t+1.  
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implied by the differences in their human capital stocks. To see this, holding fixed the 
share of time that is spent training, the reduction in earnings would reflect exactly the 
lower stock of human capital.  The optimal catch-up response, however, implies that a 
recently unemployed individual increases the share of time that is spent training.  
Therefore, he necessarily decreases the share of time spent producing disposable 
earnings, which results in observed earnings that are lower than would be implied solely 
by the reduction in the human capital stock.  
In subsequent time periods, because of the catch-up response, the gap in human 
capital stocks diminishes between those who had and had not experienced 
unemployment.  Differences in the shares of time spent training, therefore, become less 
pronounced.  The later convergence of disposable earnings reflects both the convergence 
of the human capital stocks as well as the convergence of the human capital investment 
decisions.  
 This conceptual model is simple but useful.  It directly links the present and the 
future through the process of human capital investment and accumulation.  By positing 
equivalence between an involuntary unemployment spell and an exogenously constrained 
human capital stock, one can examine the effects of such unemployment on future 
behavior and outcomes.21 In our empirical analysis, we assume that observed hourly 
wages are net of human capital training costs. Wage rate differentials reflect both 
differences in human capital stocks and differences in the amount of time spent in on-the-
job training.   
 
                                                          
21 This model does not address job search or time voluntary spent not working.  These and other limitations 
are discussed in Appendix 1. 
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IV.  THE EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND THE DATA 
 The chief goal of this research is to provide policy-relevant predictions of the 
long-term effects of youth unemployment on future labor market outcomes.  The 
preceding conceptual model provides a link between prior unemployment and future 
behaviors and outcomes through the human capital accumulation process.  In this model, 
an exogenous unemployment spell results in sub-optimal human capital acquisition that 
directly affects future decisions and outcomes.  Here we address crucial econometric, 
data, and empirical issues.   
We jointly model the endogenous schooling, training, and labor market decisions 
and outcomes of young people over time.  Each year, a young person chooses whether to 
train, to attend school, and to participate in the labor market.  Conditional on his labor 
force participation, he chooses how many hours to work annually.  A young man may 
also experience unemployment, either voluntary or involuntary, during the year.  Hourly 
earnings as well as schooling, training, and labor force participation may be affected by 
the unemployment.  We jointly estimate this system of equations using the 
semiparametric, full-information maximum likelihood method suggested for single 
equations by Heckman and Singer (1984) and extended to simultaneous equations by 
Mroz and Guilkey (1992) and Mroz (1999).  This discrete factor maximum likelihood 
(DFML) method allows complex correlation across equations and over time.  It explicitly 
models and controls for the contaminating effects of heterogeneity and endogeneity. 
By using this procedure, we are able to control effectively for the endogeneity of 
a wide range of the youths’ previous decisions and outcomes on their later behaviors and 
outcomes.  For example, we are able to model a wide range of endogenous behavioral 
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determinants including previous unemployment, job changing, schooling, and work 
experience.  The estimates reported in this study, then, should be interpreted as the 
impacts of an exogenously induced change in the endogenous determinants.  
Furthermore, by controlling for endogeneity for this wide range of employment, training, 
and wage determinants, the estimates reported here should provide more relevant 
predictions for policy evaluations than those found in previous studies of the impacts of 
youth unemployment.    
 
Modeling the Outcomes of Interest 
 In a study of this type, there are many potentially endogenous human capital 
variables that are used as explanatory variables.  They include the stocks of education and 
work experience, as well as prior unemployment.  In addition, there are potential self-
selection issues for the observed working and training outcomes.  To account for these 
potential sources of bias, up to eight behavioral outcomes are jointly modeled every year 
for each young person in the sample.  These outcomes are: (log) average hourly earnings; 
whether or not a young man works; annual hours worked if working; whether or not a 
young man is unemployed; annual weeks of unemployment if unemployed; whether the 
individual changed jobs; school attendance; and training.  We also specify an initial 
condition equation to control for the endogeneity of each person’s schooling attainment at 
the start of the panel.  
Log average hourly earnings are specified to be Mincer-type earnings functions.  
They depend upon polynomials in age and in cumulative work experience, the stock of 
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education and demographic variables.22  Hourly earnings may also be affected by prior 
unemployment.23  We also allow hourly earnings to be affected by recent job changes in 
order to separate out the effects of experiencing unemployment from those attributable to 
just changing one’s employer.  We allow for up to five annual lags for weeks spent 
unemployed and for job changes.  
Annual hours of work depend upon local labor market conditions, polynomials in 
age and in labor force experience, education, prior unemployment and demographic 
variables.  Annual weeks of unemployment depend upon local labor market conditions, 
polynomials in age and in labor force experience, education, prior unemployment and 
demographic variables.  Training is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a young 
person took part in any government-sponsored or vocational training in a particular 
year.24  It depends upon polynomials in age and in labor force experience, education, 
local labor market conditions, demographic variables and five years of unemployment 
and job change histories.  Schooling is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a 
young person participated in any secondary or post-secondary education in a particular 
year.  It depends upon polynomials in age and in labor force experience, demographic 
variables, and prior unemployment.  Each of these equations also includes four time 
period dummies (for 1979, 1980 to 1982; and 1992 to 1994, with 1983-1991 being the 
                                                          
22 The stock of education is measured by highest grade completed, whether a young man possesses a high 
diploma or a general equivalence degree (GED) and whether he possesses a four-year college degree. 
23 If the mechanism through which unemployment affects wages is exclusively forgone human capital, 
there should be no effect of prior unemployment on wages after perfectly controlling for the human capital 
stock.  Perfectly controlling for the human capital is unlikely, however, because the human capital variables 
are only proxy measures. 
24 The NLSY79 questionnaire was altered in 1987 when its management was transferred to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), and no training questions were asked in this year.  In 1988, the questionnaire asked 
whether any training had occurred either in 1987 or 1988. 
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excluded category). Complete specifications for all equations, along with point estimates 
and standard errors, are reported in Appendix 2. 
 
The Likelihood Function 
 To derive the likelihood function for the system of equations to be estimated, we 
use the following observed sequence for each young person i in each year t: 
{isi, asit, trit, workit, hwit, unit, wuit, chit, wit} where: 
isi is initial schooling at the start of the NLSY79 survey 
asit is a dummy variable for school attendance in year t 
trit is a dummy variable for any vocational training in year t 
workit is a dummy variable for working in year t 
hwit is hours worked during year t (if working)  
unit is a dummy variable for experiencing unemployment in year t 
wuit is the number of weeks unemployed in year t (if unemployed) 
chit is a dummy variable indicating a job change in year t 
wit is the logarithm of average hourly earnings in year t (if working) 
 
Let εit be a vector with nine elements that contain unobserved determinants of the 
above outcomes.  These unobserved determinants are specified to have an error-
component structure: ititiit u +η+ρµ=ε , where ρ is a matrix of factor loads and µi is a 
vector of unobserved factors.  This represents a permanent/transitory error specification.  
Assume uit is a mean-zero iid normal error vector.  The primary substantive restriction 
this error-components structure places on the density of εit is that all correlation across 
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equations in different time periods enters solely through the linear factors µi . Within time 
periods, the covariance pattern is unrestricted due to the freely-estimated relationships 
among the elements of ηit, though we do impose that the joint distribution does not vary 
through time.  The factors µi capture unobserved determinants that do not vary as young 
people age such as, perhaps, ability.25  The factor ηit captures time-specific unobserved 
determinants that may vary across time such as preferences for work.26  It allows for 
arbitrary, contemporaneous correlation of outcomes at each point in time that is not 
captured by the person specific unobserved factor. 
As an example of a discrete outcome, consider training, trit.  As with the other 
four dummy variable outcomes modeled in this study, a latent index specification is used. 

























ττ          Equation 1  
At each point in time, a young man trains if the value of his latent index is positive.  The 
decision to train is influenced by a vector of observed variables, xtr,it.  This vector of 
variables, briefly discussed earlier, includes background characteristics together with 
demographic and (potentially endogenous) human capital variables.27  This decision is 
also influenced by permanent and transitory factors that are not observed.  Crucially, the 
decision to train is also influenced by prior unemployment and prior job changes for up to 
                                                          
25 The error structure for initial schooling is modeled only with the permanent heterogeneity factors.   
26 This specification we use is linear in two permanent heterogeneity factors and is nonlinear in the 
transitory heterogeneity factor.   
27 These variables are listed in Tables 1 and 2 in the data section and in Appendix 2. 
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five years.28  This study focuses on the estimates of the β’s, the impacts of prior 
unemployment, for each of the eight outcomes:  
1,...,5 τand  wch, wu,un,hw,work,tr,as,ofor  β τo, == . 
















,        Equation 2                               
Every year for each young man, annual hours of work are influenced by a vector of 
observed variables and unobserved error terms.  As with the other outcomes, hours of 
work are also influenced by prior unemployment and job changes for up to five years. 
A researcher can control for the contaminating effects of heterogeneity and 
endogeneity by integrating out the unobserved factors, µi and ηit.  For example, if the 
factors were normally distributed, one could use multivariate normal maximum 
likelihood.  The discrete factor integration method used in this study assumes that the 
underlying continuous distributions of the factors can be suitably approximated by 
discrete distributions with mass points and probability weights that are estimated jointly 
with the other parameters in the system.  Integration is greatly simplified since it requires 
only summing the suitably weighted products of density functions and univariate 
integrals.  Further, the researcher does not have to make a priori assumptions about the 
distribution of the factors since the discrete approximation is driven by the data.    
Conditional upon the factors, the contribution to the likelihood of individual i in 
year t is: 
                                                          
28 The choice of a five-year lag structure is somewhat arbitrary.  There is some evidence that 
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       Equation 3 
where fh is the annual hours worked density, fw is the log wage density, fwu is the annual 
weeks unemployed density, and Θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 Approximating the distributions of µi and ηit with mass points µ1j, for j = 1,…,J, 
µ2k, for k = 1,…,K, and ηm (vector) for m = 1,…,M, the unconditional contribution to the 
likelihood function of individual i  is : 
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fis is the density for the potentially endogenous initial condition describing schooling 
completed at the start of the longitudinal survey, and Γ is the vector containing the 
parameters of the discrete distributions.  
 
Identification 
 This study treats training, school attendance, work experience, prior job changes, 
and unemployment as potentially endogenous variables that evolve as the young men in 
the sample age.  These variables are outcomes as well as determinants of later outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
29 The decision to work, wages and unemployment are modeled only for those young men not in school.  
Further, annual hours of work and wages are modeled only if a young man chooses to work, while weeks of 
unemployment are modeled only for those who experience a spell of unemployment during the year. 
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Therefore, it is important to demonstrate that there is sufficient information to obtain 
identification of the effect of lagged outcomes, prior unemployment in particular, on 
current labor market events.  
 Because we treat the youths’ places of residence as exogenous, this analysis 
contains numerous non-deterministically varying, time-dependent exogenous variables.  
These include local unemployment rates and the real level of minimum wages, an urban 
residence dummy, region dummy variables, state-level college undergraduate tuition 
levels, and separately real per-pupil state expenditures on secondary and post-secondary 
education (see Table 2).  It is important to ask whether these variables are sufficient to 
achieve identification of the approximation to the structural model. 
 As discussed in Bhargava (1991) and Mroz and Surette (1998), panel-data 
relationships like those examined here implicitly provide many additional identification 
conditions than one might infer by simply counting the number of contemporaneous 
exogenous variables (e.g., instruments) excluded from a structural equation of interest. 
There are two primary reasons for this.  
 First, consider the case of linear dynamic models examined by Bhargava (1991), 
in which one is willing to impose stability on the structural parameters over time.  In the 
empirical model, we also impose this restriction.  Bhargava derives the reduced form 
equations for a system of dynamic equations and demonstrates that every lag of each 
instrumental variable could have a separate impact on the “contemporaneous” value of an 
endogenous explanatory variable.  The time dimension for the exogenous time-varying 
instruments, therefore, creates a multiplicity of “instruments” associated with each 
“exclusion restriction,” resulting in significantly more degrees of freedom to control for 
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endogenous determinants.  His analysis demonstrates that over-identification can be 
obtained under quite weak conditions in linear dynamic models. 
 A second source of identification arises in the context of dynamic nonlinear 
models.  Mroz and Surette (1998) discuss this in greater detail.  Their discussion exploits 
the fact that variations in the time ordering of the exogenous variables provide even 
higher degrees of over-identification than would be obtained by a simple reference to 
Bhargava’s (1991) observation discussed above.  It is especially appropriate for economic 
relationships like school attendance and work decisions, in which there can be 
considerable fixed costs of changing status over time.   
 The basic idea underlying their argument of additional identification is that, in 
dynamic nonlinear models of the type used here, the impact of any lagged exogenous 
variable on a current endogenous explanatory variable depends crucially on the precise 
forms of the prior time series of all exogenous variables.  Implicitly, the impact of any 
single lagged exogenous variable is modified by prior lagged values of all other 
exogenous variables.  For example, the impact of low college tuition in 1984 on school 
attendance for a 21 year old in 1984 would depend explicitly on school attendance at age 
20; the magnitude of the 1984 tuition effect in the “reduced form equation,” then, would 
depend on the level of tuition in 1983.  Further, the magnitude of the impact of the tuition 
variable at age-20 on age-20 attendance depends on the lagged (age 19) attendance 
decision; and so this reduced form effect depends interactively on tuition levels at that as 
well as prior ages.  As long as subsequent values of the lagged exogenous variables 
cannot be perfectly forecasted in time-separable non-linear models, there should be an 
even greater degree of identification than that discussed by Bhargava (1991). 
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 As another example, consider the local unemployment rate.  At any point in time, 
such a variable is exogenous to young people.  In 1985, variation in this rate has a direct 
impact on 1985 labor market outcomes.  Similarly, variation in 1983 has a direct impact 
on 1983 outcomes.  Because of the timing of decision-making, however, the 1983 rate 
has no direct impact on 1985 outcomes except through the accumulated stock of human 
capital as of 1985.  As a consequence, the 1983 rate is, theoretically, an instrument for 
human capuital stocks observed in in 1985.   
 By using an explicit sequential dynamic modeling framework one can incorporate 
all such interactions that depend on the precise timing and sequencing of the values of the 
time-varying exogenous variables. The maximum likelihood approach we use here 
automatically incorporates these interactions among the time series properties of the sets 
of exogenous variables.  They do so efficiently, without one having to resort to including 
numerous time-varying interactions of the exogenous variables in an arbitrary fashion, as 
would be the case with a more static instrumental variables approach. 
 Identification in this model is also secured through contemporaneous, theoretical 
exclusion restrictions and functional form.  Some of the time-varying exogenous 
variables already mentioned, for example, can be assumed to affect indirectly the 
schooling and training decisions and labor supply but have no direct impact on wages 
other than through the human capital stock.  They are, therefore, excluded from the wage 
equation.  And, of course, it is certainly the case that our assumed functional forms for 
index functions do provide some additional “over-identification” above that which could 
be achieved in a fully nonparametric model that only incorporated the dynamic exclusion 
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restrictions discussed above and interactions among the sequences of lagged exogenous 
variables. 
 
Alternative Approaches to Estimation  
 To assess some of the more important findings in this paper, we also use more 
standard single-equation approaches to estimate the impact of prior unemployment on 
particular outcomes of interest.30  For the most part, these alternative approaches provide 
estimates that are qualitatively similar to those from the discrete factor maximum 
likelihood approach, and in only one instance do we find evidence of significant 
differences between the fixed-effect estimates and the DFML estimates.  It is important to 
note that for the labor market and schooling outcomes that we examine, there could be 
potentially serious sample selection biases.  In most instances, only the DFML estimator 
has the potential to control for such selection biases when compared to the single-
equation approaches.  Further, since much of our analysis explicitly deals with 
moderately complex patterns of prior outcomes influencing current outcomes through the 
process of human capital accumulation, one should discount the relevance of the 
conditional/fixed-effect logit estimates presented here.  Such estimators can exhibit 
considerable bias when the outcome of interest depends on prior outcomes for the 
process.31 
 
                                                          
30 For continuous dependent variables, these are ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effect regressions.  
For discrete dependent variables, these are probit and Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional/fixed-effect logit. 
31 See Chamberlain (1984, pp 1274-1278). 
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The Data 
 The primary data for this research are taken from the 1979 National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and its geocode supplement.  We use young men who were 
14 to 19 years old in 1979 and are drawn from both the representative sample and the 
over-samples of blacks and Hispanics.  This yields a sample size of 3,731, of which 2,286 
are from the representative sample and 1,445 are from the two over-samples.  We follow 
these young men through 1994.  When constructing this sample, we applied the following 
two selection criteria.32  First, a young man remains in the sample until his first non-
interview date, after which he leaves the sample regardless of whether he is interviewed 
at some future date.33  Second, those young men not in the initial military sub-sample 
who enter the armed forces permanently leave the sample upon entry.34 
 Table 1 contains variable descriptions and summary statistics for the time-
invariant characteristics of our sample.  The first column of numbers contains the sample 
means for the entire sample.  The next two columns contain the means for the 
representative and over-sample portions respectively.  The variable afqt is derived from 
the 1980 Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).35  The scores from this test are 
regressed against age dummies to purge pure age effects.36  Each value is then mean-
differenced using the mean for the entire sample. 
                                                          
32 By 1986, these selection criteria affect nearly 25% of the sample.  By 1994, nearly 40% is affected. 
33 The average length of a non-interview spell is greater than three years.  Given the age of this sample, the 
failure to observe outcomes for this length of time could induce bias in estimates of interest.  If the attrition 
process is random, this selection procedure does not bias the estimates.  See MaCurdy, Mroz and Gritz 
(1998) for a detailed analysis of attrition from the NLSY. 
34 Despite the role that training plays in the armed forces, those young men who enter the military report no 
training.   
35 Approximately 90% of the original cohort was administered the AFQT test. 
36 For those in my sample not administered the test, a predicted value is assigned using the race-specific 
mean residual from the age regression. 
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 The first eight rows of Table 2 contain the unweighted means for the entire 
sample in 1979, 1986 and 1993 of the outcomes that are jointly modeled in this study.  As 
shown in Figure 1, average annual weeks of unemployment appear quite anti-cyclical 
over this 16-year period, peaking in the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s.  
Figure 1 shows averages both for the entire sample and conditional upon any 
unemployment during the year.  Average school attendance declines monotonically 
throughout the 16-year period.  Average participation in vocational training rises to a 
maximum of 18.0% in 1993 but declines slightly in 1994.  Average annual hours of work 
rise monotonically from 481 in 1979 to 2,034 in 1991.  They decline somewhat in 1992 
and 1993 but return to their 1991 level by 1994.  Real average hourly earnings (in logs) 
rise monotonically from 1979 to 1993.37  Training started out low in 1979, reflecting the 
young age of the sample at that date. By 1993, over one in six young men reported some 
type of formal vocational training.  The remaining rows in Table 2 contain the time-
varying unweighted averages for other variables used in this study. 
                                                          
37 Average hourly earnings are defined as total annual earnings from wages and salary divided by annual 
hours worked.  They are deflated using the CPI-UX1 price index with a base year of 1982. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Time-Invariant Characteristics                                     














Afqt Armed forces qualification test score 0.00 
(28.13) 




Initsch Initial level of schooling 9.64 
(1.67) 
9.75   
(1.63) 
9.45
   (1.71)
Mohgc Mother's highest grade completed 
 
10.86   
(3.12) 
11.60 





Father's highest grade completed 
 
10.96   
(3.64) 
11.90 
   (3.38) 
9.46  
(3.54)





Age 14: Household had a library card 0.68 0.72 0.61
prot  
 
Age 14: Young man raised protestant 0.50 0.50 0.49
Livpar 
 





Black in random sample 0.07 0.11 0.00
Hispanic 
 
Hispanic in random sample 0.05 0.07 0.00
Overblack 
 
Over-sampled Black  0.24 0.00 0.69
Overhisp 
 
Over-sampled Hispanic 0.15 0.00 0.31
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Time-Variant Variables 














un Dummy variable: 
Any unemployment during the year 
0.30 0.29 0.19






work Dummy variable: 
Any work during the year 
0.58 0.93 0.93






lnw Log of deflated average hourly earnings from 







anysch Dummy variable: 






train Dummy variable: 




chjob Dummy Variable: 
Change job in prior year  
0.0027 0.1027 0.0660
age Age 16.55   
(1.60) 




exp Cumulative labor force experience in hours/2000 0.24 





hgc Highest grade in years completed 9.64 
(1.67) 




geddeg Dummy Variable: 




hsdeg Dummy Variable: 
Holds a high school diploma  
0.15 0.66 0.69
coldeg Dummy Variable: 
Holds a four-year college degree 
0.00 0.12 0.19
urb Dummy Variable : 
Residence is urban 
0.80 0.82 0.81
ne Dummy Variable : 
Residence is Northeastern US 
0.20 0.18 0.17
nc Dummy Variable : 
Residence is North-Central US 
0.26 0.25 0.26
so Dummy Variable : 
Residence is Southern US 
0.36 0.37 0.37
we Dummy Variable : 
Residence is Western US 
0.19 0.20 0.20





   (2.60)
expsec Per-pupil public expenditure on secondary 
institutions (in 1982 dollars) 






expps Per-pupil public expenditure on post-secondary 
institutions (in 1982 dollars) 






ugtuit Annual undergraduate tuition at main or largest 
campus of state university (in 1982 dollars) 






Mw The larger of federal or state-level hourly 
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Year
Series with triangles is average conditional on any unemployment during the year.
Series with diamonds is average for the entire sample.
Source: NLSY79.




There are several sources of state-level data that are matched to the NLSY 
sample.  The first is data taken from the Digest of Education Statistics (DES) on per-
student public expenditure at public secondary education institutions.  The second is DES 
data on per-student public expenditure at post-secondary education institutions.  The third 
is data taken from the Integrated Post Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS) on 
annual tuition prices at the largest or main campus of the state university system.38  These 
expenditure and tuition data have been deflated using the CPI-UX1 deflator and show 
substantial variation through time and across states.  For example, in 1979 the New 
England states spent nearly 25% more per-student on secondary education than southern 
                                                          
38 We are grateful to Alex Cowell for the tuition price data. 
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states, while tuition charges at public universities in the South were 80% lower than 
charges in New England.  By 1986, these differentials were 37% and 49% respectively.   
Data on mandated minimum wages are also matched to the NLSY sample.  
Because certain states, notably California, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, often have 
mandates that exceed the federal minimum, we use the larger of the federal or state 
mandate.  These data are also deflated and show considerable variation over time.  As 
shown in Figure 2, the real value in 1982 dollars of the federal minimum wage declined 
by about 30% from 1979 to 1989, a period during which the federal mandate remained 
unchanged.  It rises in 1990 and 1991 due to legislated increases, but declines thereafter.  


























79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
Year
Source: US Department of Labor and Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 2: Real Value of the Federal Minimum Wage
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V.  ESTIMATION AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
 This section discusses the key DFML estimates using the empirical specification 
in Section IV.39  These results are organized into four general topics.  The first topic is 
evidence of a “catch-up” response to unemployment as measured by the effect of an 
unemployment spell on the probability of training and working and on annual hours 
worked.  The second is evidence of persistence in unemployment.  The third is evidence 
of long-lived “blemishes” of unemployment as measured by forgone average hourly 
earnings.  The fourth section presents simulation evidence of impacts of unemployment 
on training, later unemployment, work, and wages during the early adult lifecycle. 
In this section, we compare the DFML estimates to estimates derived from two 
types of single-equation specifications.  The first type of single-equation specification 
does not control for the endogeneity of prior unemployment.  It is either probit or 
ordinary least squares (OLS).  According to a likelihood ratio test criterion, the 
probit/OLS specifications, when estimated jointly but independently, are overwhelmingly 
rejected in favor of the DFML specification.  The (log) likelihood value for the 
independent probit/OLS estimates is –230,148.9 based on 364 parameters.  The 
likelihood value for the DFML estimates is –220,859.4 based on 444 parameters.  This 
amounts to an improvement of 9,289.5 in the likelihood value for only 80 additional 
parameters. 
The second type of single-equation specification for comparison uses an 
individual-specific fixed-effects (FE) model to control for possible unobserved 
                                                          
39 A complete set of DFML estimates may be found in Appendix 2.  These estimates are obtained from a 
model that uses two permanent linear heterogeneities with five and four mass points respectively, and a 
vector of transitory nonlinear heterogeneities with six mass points.  This amounts to 80 additional 
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heterogeneity.40  The FE specification is inconsistent in this setting if, for example, 
unobserved preferences for work change as young people age.  In general, we find that 
the FE point estimates are less precise relative to their DFML counterparts.  There is little 
evidence, however, that the gain in precision with the use of the random-effects DFML 
specification comes at the expense of consistency.  For most key results, such as the wage 
effect of prior unemployment, the FE point estimates are statistical indistinguishable from 
DFML estimates, the latter of which control more parametrically for unobserved 
heterogeneity and do not ignore possible self-selection biases 
 
A Catch-Up Response 
 The conceptual model discussed earlier presents the notion that individuals 
display an optimal catch-up response to an involuntary unemployment spell.  This 
impetus to undertake “extra” training mitigates the effect of the spell on potential 
earnings over time.  The DFML estimates strongly support this notion of a catch-up 
response.  Table 3 displays estimates of the effects of prior unemployment on three 
separate outcomes: whether a young man trains (“Any Training”); whether a young man 
works (“Any Work”); and, how many hours a young man works annually conditional 
upon working (“Annual Hours Worked”).41  
                                                                                                                                                                             
parameters over a model with no heterogeneity for the 129 possible outcomes we examine (8 outcomes for 
each of 16 time periods plus one initial condition). 
40 In the case of a dummy variable outcome, we use a conditional logit model  (Chamberlain, 1980).  In the 
presence of occurrence dependence or lagged endogenous variables, this estimator is inconsistent.  A 
complete set of single-equation results with and without fxed effects is available from the authors on 
request. 
41 In all equations, prior unemployment is measured as weeks per year.  The other variables used in these 
equations are listed in Tables 1 and 2, together with the time period dummies and squares in age and 
experience.   See Appendix 2 for complete specifications. 
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 The estimate in the first row of Table 3 indicates that unemployment in the prior 
period has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of training in this period.  
This training effect, however, is somewhat short-lived.  The longer-term effects fall to 
zero quite rapidly, and specification tests indicate no statistically significant effect 
beyond the first year.42  This is the key estimate in this table, which indicates a 
statistically significant effect of having recently experienced unemployment on training.  
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence of such a “catch up” response in the 
literature.  Recent unemployment, after controlling for the endogeneity of the 
unemployment spell, appears to induce young men to undertake more training. 
Table 3: Evidence of Catch-Up Response 
(The Effect of One Week of Unemployment on Training, Work Participation, and 
Hours Worked) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Bold-faced indicates significance at the 5% level 
Method 
Outcome 
Lag of Annual Weeks of Unemployment 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 



































































* Robust standard errors. 
                                                          
42 A specification test fails to reject the hypothesis that only the first lag is significant.  An empirical 
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The other DFML estimates in Table 3 buttress the notion of a compensatory 
behavioral response.  There appears to be little response of subsequent work behavior to 
prior unemployment.  Conditional on working, however, the initial effect of prior 
unemployment on annual hours worked is large and negative, perhaps reflecting the fact 
that we assigned weeks of unemployment to the calendar year containing the longest part 
of a spell interrupted at January 1.  Each of the four longer-term effects, however, is 
significantly positive.  A 26-week spell experienced as long ago as five years increases 
hours worked by 32 hours per year.43  
Table 3 also presents estimates from fixed effect (FE) and OLS estimators for 
hours worked.  Both of these estimators yield point estimates that are more negative for 
the impact of unemployment experienced last year.  The OLS estimates of the former 
effect indicate a much larger initial negative effect (standard error), –11.86 (0.67), than 
either of the other two approaches.  For additional lags, both of these alternative estimates 
tend to indicate smaller responses that vary considerably from lag to lag.  The estimates 
reported in this table support the notion of increased job training immediately after being 
unemployed, as was suggested by the theoretical model.  They also suggest increases in 
hours of work after experiencing unemployment.  This effect is not directly captured in 
our theoretical model, but it is consistent with a spell of unemployment inducing a wealth 
effect on future hours of work. 
The effect of prior unemployment on the probability a young man trains is a key 
result of this study.  Therefore, we compare the DFML point estimates of this effect with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
specification that excluded the four insignificant lags yielded similar estimates to those in Table 3.  
43 This effect is obtained by multiplying the point estimate by 26: 1.2408*26 = 32.26. 
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two more conventional specifications.44  For the DFML specification, the effect of one 
week of unemployment is equivalent to a 0.41 percentage-point reduction in the local 
unemployment rate. The standard error of this effect is 0.16.45  Using an identical probit 
specification (for the explanatory variables), we find the same point estimate of 0.41 with 
a standard error of 0.14.  Using an identical conditional/fixed-effects logit, the effect is 
equivalent to a 0.32 percentage point reduction with a standard error of 0.15.  Each of 
these three procedures implies increased training in response to an unemployment spell, 
and we consider this to be compelling evidence for the catch-up response derived from 
the theoretical model.  Note, however, that neither the probit nor the conditional logit are 
consistent if past human capital investments are endogenous, especially if training has an 
impact on earnings and labor supply decisions.  
It is important to note that our specification for training also controls for whether 
an individual changed jobs during the prior year.46  We included this control because it is 
quite likely that those taking on new jobs might spend some time in formal training 
programs in order to learn new job skills.  If we had failed to control for job changes, an 
unemployment event might merely be an imperfect signal of a job change and its 
attendant new-job training.  Not one of the three estimation procedures, however, 
                                                          
44 These comparisons require a normalization of the different point estimates since they are derived from 
different probability specifications.  For this normalization, we use the estimated coefficient of the local 
unemployment rate in the training equation because it is an effect that is fairly precisely estimated by each 
approach.  In all instances, higher local unemployment rates appear associated with less training.  For the 
DFML specification, the normalization is 0.00351/(–0.00846) = –0.4149.  For probit, it is 0.0035/(–0.0086) 
= –0.4070.  For conditional logit, it is 0.0062/(–0.01968) = –0.3147.  The negative sign indicates that these 
relative effects can be expressed in terms of a reduction in the local unemployment rate. 
45 The standard errors of these normalized effects assume that the scaling factors are fixed.  
46 Recall that for the DFML specification, we explicitly model contemporaneous job changing that is not 




uncovered a significant response of job training to having changed a job in either of the 
two prior years.  
Taken as a whole, the estimates in Table 3, as well as the probit and conditional 
logit results discussed in the text, provide strong evidence of a catch-up response to 
unemployment.  They indicate that unemployment experienced by a young man today 
significantly increases the likelihood of his undertaking training in the near future.  The 
DFML estimates also indicate that unemployment today also significantly increases the 
number of hours he will work (conditional upon working) for up to five years. 
 
Persistence in Unemployment 
 Like many previous studies, we examine how the duration of prior unemployment 
affects the incidence and duration of future unemployment.  In general, the literature 
shows that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity greatly reduces measured persistence 
in unemployment.  The evidence presented here supports that particular finding.  Many of 
these previous studies also find that no persistence remains after the use of controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  This study disagrees with that finding.  We find that there is 
strong and statistically significant evidence of short-lived persistence in unemployment. 
 Table 4 displays estimates of the effects of prior unemployment on the probability 
of experiencing subsequent unemployment and on annual weeks of unemployment if 
unemployed.  The effect for both outcomes is quite pronounced for the first lag, but 
subsequently diminishes by an order of magnitude or more.  Unemployment as long as 
four years ago, however, has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of a 
contemporaneous spell of unemployment. 
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Table 4: Evidence of Persistence  
(The Effect of One Week of Unemployment on the Incidence and Duration of 
Unemployment) 
DFML estimates with standard errors in parentheses 
Bold-faced indicates significance at the 5% level 
Outcome Lag of Annual Weeks of Unemployment 
 
 




























The positive effect of prior unemployment on the duration of a current spell is 
short-lived but quite significant.  A 26-week spell experienced last year increases the 
duration of a contemporaneous unemployment spell, if unemployed, by 3.8 weeks 
annually.47  The effect is an order of magnitude smaller for all longer lags. With OLS 
regressions of current unemployment on prior unemployment, Ellwood (1982) finds 
strong evidence of state dependence in weeks of unemployment.  He finds that all 
evidence of state dependence vanishes, however, upon controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity with FE specifications. 
In this study, the OLS and FE estimates are qualitatively similar to those in 
Ellwood’s study: 0.2393 (0.0158) and 0.0073 (0.0157) respectively per week unemployed 
in the prior year.  The OLS estimate indicates a strong influence on later unemployment 
durations, while the use of a FE specification eliminates all evidence of persistence.  On 
the other hand, the DFML estimate rules out an absence of persistence.  A Hausman 
(1978) test of any difference between the FE and DFML estimates rejects the null 
hypothesis of no difference.  This indicates that additional controls for unobserved 
                                                          
47 This measure is 0.1447*26 = 3.7622. 
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heterogeneity might be necessary.  It is important to note that this is the only important 
instance where a DFML estimate appears substantively and statistically different from an 
associated FE estimate.  The FE estimator, however, cannot control well for possible 
sample selection bias.  
 
Long-Lived Blemishes 
 One of the most important measures of the long-term impact of youth 
unemployment is the effect of a spell on future earnings.  Forgone work experience may 
reverberate throughout a young person’s life.  Perhaps this is because one job leapfrogs 
into another, and early unemployment would delay some of the first jumps.  It may also 
be because lost experience, as posited by dual labor market theorists, permanently tracks 
young people into jobs characterized by low wages and little room for advancement.48  
Ellwood (1982), for example, finds that prior work experience has a large and positive 
earnings effect.  Forgone experience, therefore, represents lost earnings power.  This 
observation is, in fact, the motivation for the theoretical model discussed earlier. 
 Table 5 displays DFML estimates of the effects of prior unemployment on log 
average hourly earnings.  This earnings equation, as with the others in this study, controls 
extensively for the observed human capital stock.  Even with these controls, there is 
evidence that the impact of prior unemployment on earnings is rather more long-lived 
than most previous studies have shown. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
48 For a discussion of these issues, see Topel and Ward (1992) and Cain (1976). 
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Table 5: Evidence of Long-Lived Blemishes in Wages 
(The Effect of One Week of Prior Unemployment on Log Average Hourly Earnings) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Bold-faced indicates significance at the 5% level 
Method Lag of Annual Weeks of Unemployment 
 
 

































* Robust standard errors. 
 
The initial earnings effect of unemployment is large and quite precisely estimated.  
The DFML estimates tend to be slightly smaller than those derived from FE or OLS 
specifications, so we focus on them.  A 26-week unemployment spell experienced last 
year reduces wages by 4.7 percent.49  In terms of 2,000 hours worked at the average wage 
rate in 1993, this is a reduction of over $1,543 in 2002 US dollars.50  A two standard error 
lower bound amounts to a 2.6% reduction in hourly earnings or over $850.  Further, a 26-
week spell experienced as long ago as three years reduces wages by 2.9 percent.  To put 
this magnitude into context, this reduction in wages due to experiencing a 26 weeks of 
unemployment is equivalent to the wage loss from forgoing one-quarter to one-half of a 
year of school.51  As predicted by the theoretical model, the earnings effect of prior 
unemployment tapers off over time.  Because it fully disappears after about four years, 
the impact of unemployment on earnings is not permanent, as suggested by a scar 
analogy.  The magnitude and duration of this effect, however, make it much more than a 
                                                          
49 This measure is –0.0018*26 = –0.0468. 
50 The average real wage rate in 1993 is 16.42 per hour in 2002 US dollars.  At 2,000 hours, this yields 
average earnings of $32,840. 
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simple blemish.  Unemployment experienced by a young man today will depress his 
earnings for several years to come.   
It is important to note that the negative earnings effect of prior unemployment 
remains even after extensive controls for the observed and potentially endogenous human 
capital stock.  At first glance, this effect suggests that unemployment does not simply 
represent forgone human capital, as suggested by dual labor market theorists.  There is, 
however, an alternative interpretation for the magnitude and duration of these effects on 
earnings.  The human capital variables used in this study are imperfect measures of 
young men’s human capital stock.  The “residual” earnings effect of unemployment that 
we find could be capturing these imperfectly measured human capital variables.  
 
Simulating Unemployment’s Total Impact on Human Capital, Training, and Earnings  
The above analysis of the earnings effect of prior unemployment above tells only 
a partial story.  A complete analysis would account simultaneously for the effects of 
reduced human capital on earnings, as was implied by the theoretical model.  For 
example, if the theoretical model were correct and one could perfectly observe the human 
capital stock, there should no independent effect of prior unemployment on earnings.  A 
complete evaluation of the impacts of unemployment must take into account the various 
avenues through which it can affect later labor market outcomes.  The DFML estimator, 
since it models the entire early lifecycle of schooling, training, work, and unemployment, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
51 The impact (standard error) of an additional year of school on log wages is 0.0791 (0.0209) in the DFML 
model. 
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provides a rich framework for tracing out the impacts of unemployment.  In this section, 
we use dynamic simulations with the DFML estimates to undertake such an analysis.52 
Before presenting the impacts of experiencing unemployment, it is necessary to 
define precisely what is meant by “unemployment.”  The literature on local average 
treatment effects, Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1994) in particular, highlights the fact that 
if individuals differ in their responses to a stimulus, there are usually an unlimited 
number of possible average effects that one could calculate given continuous 
instrumental or forcing variables.  In this study we focus on two of these measures.53   
The first measure we analyze is a population average effect.  We define this as the 
average impact in our sample on an outcome of interest if a worker were forced to 
experience a six-month spell of unemployment at age 22.54  In practice, we start with all 
individuals in our sample who were 14 to 16 years old in 1979, and we simulate 
outcomes for them until age 21 using the complete set of DFML estimates.  Then, for 
each “individual” at age 22 who was not simulated to be in school or out of the labor 
force, we “force” them to experience no unemployment at that age and complete their 
simulated lifecycle for up to 10 additional years.  We do this 50 times for each individual 
and use this as a baseline simulation for individuals who were “forced” not to experience 
unemployment.  Next, starting at age 22, we force the same group of “individuals” to 
experience 26 weeks of unemployment and a 50% reduction of their labor market 
experience for that year.  We also force a job change.  Again, we complete the simulated 
                                                          
52 The estimates presented in Tables 3 through 5 above were partial derivative effects.  These simulations 
are more equivalent to total derivatives. 
53 Heckman (1990) discusses alternative measures of the effect. 
54 We do not use data from the “poor” white subsample in the NLSY in this study because of the peculiar 
selection issues that might arise.   Appropriate weights for aggregating the stratified but random samples 
we use are not available.  Consequently, we do not adjust our estimates to reflect the distribution of 
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lifecycle for up to 10 additional years for this group.  Our population average effect, 
therefore, corresponds to those workers who, at age 22, were forced to experience 26 
weeks of unemployment.  We refer to this effect as “Forced Unemployment” in the 
graphs discussed below. 
We also consider one particular form of the local average treatment effect.  To do 
this, we again examine each of the above “individuals” at age 22.  At that age, we ask, for 
individuals who were not in school and were working but did not experience any 
unemployment, whether an increase of two standard deviations in the local 
unemployment rate would induce them into unemployment.55  This defines a select group 
of individuals who, because of their particular configuration of exogenous explanatory 
variables up to age 22 and the configurations of their permanent and transitory 
heterogeneity at age 22, were susceptible to becoming unemployed because of a 
worsening local labor market.  After selecting this group of individuals, as above we 
“force” them to experience 26 weeks of unemployment, lose one half of their age-22 job 
experience for that year, and experience a job change.  Here, each individual’s “treatment 
effect” is identical to the effect for them in the calculation of the population average 
effect.  In fact, the only difference between these two ways of measuring the effects of 
unemployment is in the set of individuals used to define the “average” impact.  The local 
average effect captures the effect of unemployment on those most likely to be adversely 
                                                                                                                                                                             
teenagers in the US at the time of the NLSY survey in 1979.  The major consequence of this is that our 
sample greatly over-represents blacks and Hispanics.    
55 A two standard deviation increase is 5.2 percentage points.  For each “individual” we draw a complete 
set of all random numbers that would enter their simulations throughout these early lifecycle simulations 
and use the same set of random numbers under each of the two scenarios.  This reduces the sampling 
variability of the estimated effects and is simple to do with pseudo random number generators. 
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impacted by worsening economic conditions.  We refer to this effect as “Induced 
Unemployment” in the graphs discussed below.    
 Figure 3 displays simulation results for the impact of forced and induced 
unemployment at age 22, described above, on job training behavior through age 31.  The 
top graphs display the level of training at each age and the lower graphs display the 
change in the fraction of training at each age in response to the unemployment event.  
The left hand graphs correspond to the population average effect and the right hand 
graphs are for the local average treatment effect.56  The series with triangles on the level 
graphs are for those who experienced unemployment at age 22.  Later graphs follow the 
same format.   
 In the first two years after experiencing unemployment, there is a one- to two-
percentage point increase in the incidence of training (about a 10 to 20% increase) for 
both unemployment effects.  This is precisely the type of catch-up response suggested by 
the theoretical model.  At age 25 and later, however, there is a slightly lower tendency to 
train for those who experienced unemployment at age 22.  While not displayed here, 
examination of the simulation results for school attendance indicates a one- to three-
percentage point reduction in school attendance rates in the mid-twenties among those 
who experienced unemployment at age 22.  By age 30, however, there are no appreciable 
differences in school attendance rates for either type of unemployment effect.  
Figure 4 displays simulation results for the impact of forced and induced 
unemployment at age 22 on employment rates through age 31.  For both types of 
“treatment” effects, there is evidence of long-lived persistence in the effect of 
                                                          
56 Note that these effects differ in this model primarily because some functional forms are nonlinear.  
 
 44
unemployment.  From ages 25 to 31, employment rates for those who experienced 
unemployment at age 22 are about two percentage points below the baseline rate.  There 
is some evidence that this persistence is shorter for those who were most likely to be 
affected by worsening local labor market conditions.  While not presented here, an 
examination of the simulated hours of work (conditional on working) indicates a 75-hour 
per year reduction in hours of work for those experiencing unemployment, with slightly 
smaller impacts for the local average treatment. 
Figure 5 presents simulation results for “state dependence” in unemployment.  
Those who experienced unemployment at age 22 are at least 10 percentage points more 
likely to experience unemployment at age 25, but by age 30 the difference in 
unemployment rates becomes quite small.  An examination of the simulated duration of 
unemployment reveals about one to two additional weeks per unemployed person year at 
age 23 for those who experienced unemployment at age 22.  It falls to essentially zero 
from age 24 to age 31.  Again, the difference between the two types of unemployment 
effects is relatively small. 
Figure 6 contains simulation results for the impact of forced and induced 
unemployment at age 22 on the log of average hourly earnings through age 31.  After 
experiencing unemployment at age 22, wages at age 23 are eight to nine percent below 
their baseline level.  According to the theoretical model, an immediate, and excessive, 
decline in wages would be expected if individuals chose jobs with high levels of on-the-
job training after experiencing unemployment.57  Immediately after age 23, however, the 
wage differential begins to shrink.  The simple theoretical model also predicted this 
                                                          
57 Informal training of this type might not be captured by our more formal measure of vocational training. 
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effect.  By age 27, the wage difference due to forced or induced unemployment falls to 
about half its size at age 23.  Nevertheless, wages for those who experienced forced or 
induced unemployment at age 22 are still three to four percent lower by age 31.  Again, 
the difference between the two types of unemployment effects we consider is fairly small.  
The simulation results presented here are generally consistent with the predictions 
of the theoretical model.58  There is evidence of increased job training after experiencing 
unemployment.  Furthermore, wages appear to fall precipitously in the first year after 
experiencing unemployment, which could reflect a combination of a relative loss in 
human capital as well as an increase in the share of time that is spent training.  This wage 
gap rapidly diminishes, but remains substantial even nine years after either forced or 
induced unemployment at age 22.  This is precisely the pattern of wages one would 
expect if there were real costs to unemployment at younger ages.  
                                                          
58 Unlike the somewhat small and relatively short-lived effects implied by the (partial-derivative) point 
estimates, however, these simulation results indicate fairly long-lived impacts of unemployment.  They 
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This research provides several new insights to our understanding of the youth 
labor market and, in particular, the long-term impacts of youth unemployment on later 
labor market outcomes.  Most importantly, there is strong evidence of a catch-up 
response to unemployment.  That is, an unemployment spell experienced today increases 
the likelihood that a young person trains in the near future.  A dynamic model of human 
capital accumulation predicts this catch-up response.  Both this theoretical implication as 
well as empirical evidence of it is new to the literature.  Of course, we have made several 
simplifying assumptions to reach both the theoretical predictions and the empirical 
conclusions.  
We also uncover relatively large longer-term impacts on earnings from 
unemployment experienced early in the employment lifecycle.  A 26-week spell of 
unemployment experienced at age 22 results in persistently lower wages through the end 
of our simulations at age 31.  The immediate wage impact is quite large and is consistent 
with a catch-up response in which workers pay for informal on-the-job training by 
accepting lower wages.  Nevertheless, substantial wage differentials remain after many 
years.  Based on our simulation results, when evaluated at 2,000 hours per year and in 
2002 US dollars, a 26-week unemployment spell experienced at age 22 results in an 
earnings loss of $1,400 to $1,650 at age 26 and in a loss of $1,050 to $1,150 at age 30.  
These lasting impacts of unemployment experienced at younger ages suggest that youth 
unemployment may not be a purely transitory phenomenon. 
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APPENDIX 1: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Notation and Setup:  
Define time to be discrete and finite, t=1, 2, 3, …, T. 
Define P to be the probability of being unemployed in any particular time period t, where 
0 ≤  P < 1. 
Define st to be the fraction of each working period devoted to (planned) training, where 0 
≤ st ≤1. 
Define λ to be the fraction of the year an individual is not unemployed, where 0 ≤ λ ≤1. 
Define Ht to be the human capital stock (or productivity) of an individual at period t. 
Define w to be the rental rate for human capital, which is constant over time. 
Define β to be the rate at which individuals discount future incomes.  
Define f(st) to be the production function of new human capital.  We assume that  
f '(.) > 0, f ''(.) < 0, and that the production function satisfies the Inada conditions (Inada, 
1964).59  These conditions imply that the marginal product of training is large when an 
individual does at least a little training, and, therefore, given the possibility of training, it 
is always optimal to devote some fraction of time to training.   
Human capital evolves as Ht+1  = Ht + f(st).   
We assume that all training takes place on the job and that the fraction of time 
devoted to training is determined before an individual learns whether he is to become 
unemployed.  If he does not experience unemployment, his potential income at time t is 
wHt and his disposable income is potential income minus the opportunity cost of training, 
w(1- st)Ht.  On the other hand, if he becomes unemployed, then potential and disposable 
                                                          
59 Given the finite time horizon, we in fact only rely on the condition that limk→0 f'(k) = ∞.   
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incomes are given by λwHt and λw(1- st) Ht, respectively.  We assume the fraction of 
time that is spent unemployed, if unemployment is experienced, is not stochastic. 
Period T  
At the last time period, it is never optimal to train because there is no future return to 
training.  In this case,  
 
wHT  if the individual works full-time. 
      Disposable Income =  
    λwHT if the individual is unemployed. 
 
We focus on the situation in which an individual maximizes the present 
discounted value of his disposable income.  Therefore, the individual’s expected utility as 
a function of the human capital stock at the start of the final period T is 
EVT (HT)  =  (1 – P)(wHT) + P(λwHT) . 
Period T–1: 
In period T–1, an individual makes a decision about how much time to devote to 
training.  Time spent training is not paid, but training in period T–1 increases the amount 
of human capital in period T.  This in turn increases disposable income in the last period.  
According to our formulation of the model, training is possible only when employed.  
Therefore, at the beginning of period T-1 an individual faces the following optimization 
problem: 
max 1−TEV  (HT-1) = 
ST-1 
P{βT-1λ (1–ST-1) wHT-1 + βTVT (HT-1 + f (λST-1))} +  
 
(1-P){βT-1 (1–ST-1) wHT-1 + βTVT(HT-1 + f (ST-1))} 
 
This optimization can be rewritten as:  
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max 1−TEV  (HT-1) = 
ST-1 
= P{βT-1λ (1–ST-1) wHT-1 + βTPλw (HT-1 + f (λST-1)) + βT(1-P)w(HT-1 + f(λST-1))} 
+ 
 
   (1-P){βT-1 (1–ST-1) wHT-1 + βTPλw (HT-1 + f (ST-1))  + βT(1-P)w(HT-1 + f(ST-1))} 
 
The first order condition (FOC) for the optimal choice of the fraction of time to devote to 











HV  - βT-1PλwHT-1  + βTP2λ2wf '(λST-1) + βTP(1–P)λw f '(λST-1)   
- βT-1(1–P)wHT-1  +  βTP(1–P)λw f '(ST-1)  +  βT(1–P)2w f '(ST-1)   
=  0 
The second order condition (SOC) for a maximum is satisfied because of the concavity of 













V   βTP2λ3wf"(λST-1) + βT P(1–P)λ2wf"(λST-1) +  
      βTP(1–P)λwf''(ST-1) + βT(1–P)2wf "(ST-1) < 0 
These conditions ensure that there exists a unique level of training that maximizes 
an individual's objective function at time period T-1.  After re-arrangement, the decision-
rule for optimal training at T-1, given the amount of capital accumulated prior to this 
period, is: 
β [Pλw  +  (1-P)w] [f '(λST-1)Pλ  +  f '(ST-1)(1-P)]  = [Pλw  +  (1-P)w] HT-1 
or 
wHT-1   =β w[f '(λST-1)Pλ  +  f '(ST-1)(1-P)]  
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The economic interpretation of this condition is that the expected income loss 
from additional training today should be equal to the expected present discounted value 
of the gain from the addition human capital available in the next time period.  
Let )( 1
*
1 −− TT HS  be the optimal choice of training as a function of the level of the 



































































V  from the second order condition.  
Therefore, those entering period T-1 with lower human capital stocks will train 
more than those entering the period with higher human capital stocks.  In anticipation of 
the main theoretical result, suppose there were two identical individuals at the start of 
period T-2, and one experienced unemployment while the other did not.  Upon entering 
period T-1, the individual who experienced unemployment in T-2 would choose to train 
more during period T-1 than the individual who did not experience unemployment. 
It is important to note that we have a single value function at the start of this time 
period, which can be evaluated at different levels of the human capital stock.  It is useful 
to rewrite the value function in a general form and prove its concavity in HT-1. 
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VT-1(S*T-1(HT-1), HT-1) = 
 
        P{βT-1λ(1-ST-1)wHT-1 + βTPλw[HT-1 + f(λST-1)] + βT(1-P)w[HT-1 + f(λST-1)]} + 
 
   (1-P){βT-1(1-ST-1)wHT-1 + βTPλw[HT-1 + f(ST-1)] + βT(1-P)w[HT-1 + f(ST-1)]} 
 













































































V βT-1Pλw(1-S*T-1) + βTP2λw + βTP(1-P)w + βT-1(1-P)w(1-S*T-1) + βTP(1-P)λw + 
βT(1-P)2w  = positive constant. 






























































































































































V  by SOCs of optimization problem at period T-1. 
 
The concavity of the value function in time period T-1 is sufficient to ensure that the 
FOCs at time T-2 define behaviors necessary to maximize the objective function at T-2.  
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Period T-2:  
The individual’s optimization problem in T-2: 
max  EVT-2(HT-2)  =  P {βT-2λ(1-ST-2)wHT-2  +  βT-1VT-1(HT-2 + f(λST-2))} 
ST-2     
+ (1-P) {βT-2(1-ST-2)wHT-2 + βT-1VT-1(HT-2  + f(ST-2))}, 
where  
 
VT-1(HT-2 + f(λST-2)) = 
 
=   P  βT-1λ(1-ST-1)w[HT-2 + f(λST-2)] + 
     
+ βTPλw[HT-2 + f(λST-2) + f(λST-1)] + βT(1-P)w[HT-2 + f(λST-2) + f(λST-1)] 
 
+ (1-P)  βT-1(1-ST-1)w[HT-2 + f(λST-2)] + 
 
+βTPλw[HT-2 + f(λST-2) + f(ST-1)] + βT(1-P)w[HT-2 + f(λST-2) + f(ST-1)] 
 
and  
VT-1(HT-2 + f(ST-2)) = 
 
=   P     βT-1λ(1-ST-1)w[HT-2 + f(ST-2)] + 
     
+ βTPλw[HT-2 + f(ST-2) + f(λST-1)] + βT(1-P)w[HT-2 + f(ST-2) + f(λST-1)] 
 
+ (1-P)   βT-1(1-ST-1)w[HT-2 + f(ST-2)] + 
 
+βTPλw[HT-2 + f(ST-2) + f(ST-1)] + βT(1-P)w[HT-2 + f(ST-2) + f(ST-1)] 
 
The value function in T-2 is concave when both VT-1(HT-2 + f(λST-2)) and  
VT-1(HT-2 + f(ST-2)) are concave in human capital stock, a result which was proved above 
for arbitrary levels of the human capital stock at the start of T-1. 
Conclusions for T, T-1, and T-2: 
1. V'T (.) = positive constant and V"T (.) = 0 because the value function in the last 
period T is linear in human capital/income.  
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2. V'T-1 (.) > 0 and V"T-1 (.) < 0 because the value function of period T-1 is concave 
in the human capital stock (or income). 
3. V'T-2 (.) > 0 and V"T-2 (.) < 0 because the value function of period T-2 is concave 
in human capital as it is a linear combination of a linear utility function and a 
concave value function in period T-1.  
Periods t < T: 
The individual’s optimization problem in each earlier period t is given by: 
max EVt(Ht) =  P{βtλ(1 – St)wHt  +  βt+1Vt+1(Ht + f(λSt))} + 
  St     















































Now we prove that the value function of an arbitrary period t < T is concave in 
human capital stock (or income).  To do this, we show that concavity of the value 
function in the next period guarantees concavity in any arbitrary period t < T.  










































































Since 0(.)' 1 >+tV  is true for time period T-3, it holds by induction for all earlier time 
periods and the value function is everywhere an increasing function of the human capital 
stock.  



































































































V βλβ  
provided that the value function of the next period is concave in the stock of human 
capital.  Again, this condition holds for T-3 and, by induction, for all earlier time periods.  
The period t second order condition for the maximal choice of training intensity is 













































The concavity of the value function of human capital in the next period t+1, the 
positive first derivative of this value function, and the concavity of the human capital 
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production function guarantee the concavity of the value function at an arbitrary period.  
This concavity, in turn, ensures that the first order conditions describe the behaviors 
necessary to maximize the expected present discounted value of disposable earnings at 
each point in time. 
Next, we establish that a larger stock of human capital results in lower investment 






























because of the concavity of the value function in t+1 and human capital production 





























dS  for any arbitrary period t < T. 
The result derived for period T-1 with an explicit formulation of the utility and 
value functions holds for an arbitrary period as well.  Therefore, an individual's optimal 
behavior is to invest less in training at higher levels of human capital holding age, t, 
constant.  Since an “exogenous” unemployment shock reduces the human capital stock at 
the start of the next time period, those who experienced unemployment will choose to 
undertake more training in the next time period.  This establishes Proposition 1 in the 
main text. 
 To establish Proposition 2 in the text, suppose that, at the start of period t+1, two 
otherwise identical individuals have human capital stocks that differ by an arbitrary 
amount ∆.  This difference in human capital stocks could have arisen because these two 
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individuals had different unemployment experiences during period t.  At the start of t+1, 
their potential earnings would differ by w∆.  By Proposition 1, the individual with the 
lower human capital stock in t will choose to invest more in additional human capital at 
t+1.  Let Nts 1+  and Uts 1+ be these two optimal decisions, where Ut
N
t ss 11 ++ <  and the superscripts 
N and U stand, respectively, for not having been unemployed at t and having been 
unemployed at time period t.  At the start of period t+2, if neither individual experienced 
unemployment during t+1, then the potential earnings would differ by 
[ ]( ) ∆<−+∆ ++ wsfsfw UtNt )()( 11  because higher levels of training increase the stock of 
human capital.  If both individuals had experienced unemployment during t+1, then 
potential earnings at the start of t+2 would differ by [ ]( ) ∆<−+∆ ++ wsfsfw UtNt )()( 11 λλ , 
which also is a convergence of the potential human capital stocks.  So, provided that 
unemployment experiences do not increase the propensity to experience future 
unemployment too severely (the model assumes a zero effect), there will be a 
convergence in expected potential earnings from t+1 to t+2.  By induction, there will be 
continued convergence in expected earnings for t+3 and for later periods.  
 The first part of Proposition 3 in the text follows directly because the fraction of 
time spent earning income (i.e., not spent training) is higher for those who did not 
experience unemployment at time t.  Therefore, the observed disposable earnings 
differential at t+1 is larger than that that implied if there were no training differential in 


















The second part of Proposition 3 in the text follows from two observations.  First, 
for a given human capital differential between two individuals, there will be a larger 
training differential at t+1 than at t+2 because the future benefit of additional human 
capital declines as t approaches T, holding constant one of the individual’s human capital 
stock.  The second observation follows form the concavity of the human capital 
production function.  Consider holding constant the human capital at t+2 for the 
individual with the higher level of human capital at the start of period t+1 by examining a 
particular type of (un)employment experience during t+1.  Following from the optimal 
catch-up response in Proposition 1, at higher levels of the other individual’s human 
capital stock for the same type of t+1 (un)employment experience, the differentials in the 
training responses at t+2 will be smaller than otherwise in the absence of the immediate 
catch-up response.  Because of the model’s assumption that future unemployment 
propensities do not depend on previous unemployment events, this implies that we can 
use equal “weights” for the two individuals when integrating over possible subsequent 
unemployment experiences.   
These two observations, in conjunction, imply that the subsequent average 
training intensities for the two types of individuals, defined by the type experiencing 
unemployment at period t, will become more similar over time.  Therefore, the 
convergence of their disposable earnings over time will reflect not only the convergence 
in their human capital stocks but also the convergence in the optimal share of time that is 
spent training.  The observed convergence in their disposable earnings after time t+1, 
therefore, would happen at a faster rate than would be implied by solely the convergence 
in their human capital stocks. 
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Model Limitations 
This model is a simple but useful tool.  It directly links the present and the future 
through the process of human capital investment and accumulation.  By establishing 
equivalence between an involuntary unemployment spell and an exogenously constrained 
human capital stock, it can examine the spell’s effects on future behavior and outcomes.  
The duration of unemployment spells, however, will vary by the intensity and duration of 
job search.  While the duration of search is potentially observable, intensity is not.  
Search intensity is a component of the unobserved heterogeneity that makes 
unemployment a potentially endogenous variable in statistical analyses.  It is unclear, 
however, what search theory would contribute to this simple framework in particular.  
The inverse relationship between search intensity and duration is unlikely to yield 
unambiguous theoretical predictions.  In this case, the answers to the questions posed 
here are entirely empirical.  On the other, this simple model uses a standard human 
capital framework to analyze these issues.  Most labor economists probably accept that 
one mechanism through which current unemployment can affect future behavior is the 
human capital stock.  Notwithstanding this acceptance, a model like this has not been 
found in the youth labor market literature.  Further, even if all youth unemployment is 
simply time spent watching television, it may still be relevant to ask whether there are 
long-term consequences, especially for future earnings. 
Finally, the model is expressed in terms of involuntary unemployment.  We note 
that much of the literature on job search views the distinction between quits and layoffs 
to have little economic content.  See, for example, McLaughlin (1991).  As is trenchantly 
noted by Gottshalk and Maloney (1985), however, much of this debate is tautological.  
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To summarize their argument, even coerced decisions can be viewed as voluntary since 
they result from re-optimization under an alternate set of constraints.  In this case, all 
unemployment may be considered voluntary.  It is not possible to distinguish the nature 
of unemployment using NLSY79 data.  Total unemployment, however, is identically the 
sum of its involuntary and voluntary components.  Isolating one of these components is 
sufficient to distinguish them empirically, since the other is identically the residual.  
Local variation in labor market conditions over time and exogenous changes in mandated 




APPENDIX 2: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD DISCRETE FACTOR ESTIMATES 
 
Log-likelihood function value: -220859.39 
Number of parameters:              444 
     
                 COEFF.     STD.ERR    T-RATIO   
Any Schooling (as):   
   1 cons_sch   -5.40282    2.30871   -2.34019 
   2 year        0.05649    0.01169    4.83332 
   3 afqt        0.00741    0.00056   13.15392 
   4 readmat    -0.03012    0.03315   -0.90864 
   5 libcard     0.06536    0.02585    2.52829 
   6 livpar      0.06613    0.02518    2.62634 
   7 prot       -0.02088    0.02485   -0.84026 
   8 black       0.16552    0.03096    5.34641 
   9 hisp        0.04341    0.03396    1.27802 
  10 nc          0.07289    0.04575    1.59320 
  11 so         -0.00419    0.06025   -0.06959 
  12 we          0.04072    0.05643    0.72156 
  13 urb         0.03687    0.03246    1.13591 
  14 ur          0.00670    0.00433    1.54613 
  15 mw          0.79964    0.48936    1.63403 
  16 mwage      -0.15555    0.02050   -7.58685 
  17 mwhgc       0.24087    0.02147   11.22086 
  18 ugtuit     -0.12351    0.25891   -0.47706 
  19 expsec     -0.26184    0.20309   -1.28928 
  20 expps      -0.21402    0.11324   -1.88995 
  21 age         0.04831    0.11669    0.41398 
  22 age2        0.00673    0.00163    4.13370 
  23 exp        -0.17608    0.01167  -15.08939 
  24 exp2        0.00670    0.00057   11.69062 
  25 hgc        -0.42516    0.06735   -6.31241 
  26 dum12y     -0.57403    0.04710  -12.18772 
  27 coldeg     -1.07555    0.05241  -20.52079 
  28 lag1sc      1.58061    0.03599   43.91313 
  29 lag1wu     -0.00688    0.00143   -4.80965 
  30 lag2wu     -0.00688    0.00151   -4.54923 
  31 lag3wu     -0.00456    0.00171   -2.66375 
  32 lag4wu     -0.00432    0.00180   -2.39687 
  33 lag5wu      0.00064    0.00178    0.36010 
  34 cumtr       0.02549    0.01142    2.23258 
  35 year79     -0.31345    0.10275   -3.05065 
  36 year8082   -0.08663    0.06421   -1.34918 
  37 year9294   -0.11862    0.06743   -1.75917 
  38 age1415     0.94031    0.24527    3.83375 
  39 age16       1.15128    0.19533    5.89391 
  40 age17       0.53692    0.15164    3.54075 
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  41 age1819    -0.11913    0.09632   -1.23677 
  42 age2021    -0.36704    0.06483   -5.66170 
  43 rhod11     -0.12899    0.08088   -1.59496 
  44 rhod12     -0.16098    0.06922   -2.32545 
 
Any Training (tr): 
  45 cons_tra   -7.62289    1.86784   -4.08113 
  46 year        0.01437    0.01215    1.18265 
  47 afqt        0.00109    0.00051    2.13251 
  48 readmat     0.01565    0.03109    0.50341 
  49 libcard     0.04166    0.02390    1.74324 
  50 livpar     -0.01075    0.02421   -0.44401 
  51 prot        0.01949    0.02231    0.87363 
  52 black      -0.00854    0.03073   -0.27794 
  53 hisp        0.02800    0.03277    0.85448 
  54 nc          0.13633    0.03974    3.43093 
  55 so          0.04304    0.05299    0.81225 
  56 we          0.08520    0.05038    1.69113 
  57 urb        -0.01042    0.02599   -0.40090 
  58 ur         -0.00846    0.00372   -2.27217 
  59 mw          0.76114    0.37831    2.01196 
  60 mwage      -0.00273    0.01451   -0.18787 
  61 mwhgc      -0.05418    0.01885   -2.87400 
  62 ugtuit     -0.32935    0.22278   -1.47837 
  63 expsec      0.35550    0.16719    2.12634 
  64 expps      -0.26458    0.09504   -2.78380 
  65 age         0.18231    0.07622    2.39182 
  66 age2       -0.00391    0.00085   -4.59464 
  67 exp         0.02128    0.01014    2.09937 
  68 exp2       -0.00004    0.00044   -0.09536 
  69 hgc         0.20305    0.05946    3.41472 
  70 dum12y      0.11290    0.03762    3.00108 
  71 coldeg      0.15048    0.04559    3.30105 
  72 lag1wu      0.00351    0.00134    2.61187 
  73 lag2wu      0.00111    0.00154    0.72009 
  74 lag3wu     -0.00188    0.00159   -1.18583 
  75 lag4wu      0.00061    0.00158    0.38600 
  76 lag5wu     -0.00054    0.00165   -0.32558 
  77 cumtr       0.25118    0.00930   27.02045 
  78 year79     -0.27332    0.09459   -2.88957 
  79 year8082    0.16708    0.05659    2.95256 
  80 year9294   -0.10617    0.04705   -2.25641 
  81 oldcoh     -0.01503    0.03663   -0.41017 
  82 lag1ch      0.03625    0.05080    0.71350 
  83 lag2ch      0.01289    0.05598    0.23032 
  84 lag3ch     -0.11927    0.06042   -1.97416 
  85 lag4ch     -0.00804    0.06231   -0.12911 
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  86 lag5ch     -0.12287    0.06438   -1.90856 
  87 rhod21      0.16462    0.07470    2.20368 
  88 rhod22      0.08093    0.05749    1.40782 
 
Any Work (work): 
  89 cons_wo    22.32405    5.19979    4.29326 
  90 year       -0.12317    0.03333   -3.69558 
  91 afqt        0.00389    0.00155    2.51672 
  92 readmat    -0.10216    0.06703   -1.52404 
  93 libcard    -0.09337    0.05690   -1.64089 
  94 livpar      0.06955    0.05639    1.23347 
  95 prot       -0.02522    0.05907   -0.42704 
  96 black      -0.42809    0.07549   -5.67083 
  97 hisp       -0.20362    0.08292   -2.45555 
  98 nc          0.34945    0.10242    3.41181 
  99 so          0.44976    0.13748    3.27137 
 100 we          0.27055    0.12232    2.21181 
 101 urb        -0.03057    0.07020   -0.43552 
 102 ur         -0.04419    0.00861   -5.13382 
 103 mw         -3.77947    1.07507   -3.51554 
 104 mwage       0.11122    0.04210    2.64217 
 105 mwhgc       0.10043    0.04463    2.25040 
 106 ugtuit      0.51153    0.57046    0.89670 
 107 expsec      1.11080    0.41570    2.67213 
 108 expps      -0.02553    0.28613   -0.08921 
 109 age        -0.06406    0.20003   -0.32028 
 110 age2       -0.00832    0.00206   -4.03865 
 111 exp         0.54387    0.02508   21.68812 
 112 exp2       -0.01910    0.00172  -11.09092 
 113 hgc        -0.20883    0.14067   -1.48456 
 114 dum12y      0.03572    0.08737    0.40881 
 115 coldeg      0.58514    0.22084    2.64967 
 116 lag1wu     -0.00144    0.00233   -0.62084 
 117 lag2wu      0.00259    0.00292    0.88722 
 118 lag3wu      0.00877    0.00317    2.76588 
 119 lag4wu      0.00004    0.00310    0.01310 
 120 lag5wu      0.00379    0.00269    1.41008 
 121 cumtr       0.15554    0.03191    4.87432 
 122 year79     -0.24914    0.27897   -0.89308 
 123 year8082    0.14971    0.14845    1.00847 
 124 year9294    0.20260    0.12490    1.62207 
 125 oldcoh      0.04065    0.10252    0.39653 
 126 lag1ch     -0.37553    0.07427   -5.05657 
 127 lag2ch     -0.07009    0.08997   -0.77907 
 128 lag3ch     -0.16504    0.09275   -1.77949 
 129 lag4ch     -0.01650    0.09935   -0.16612 
 130 lag5ch     -0.00535    0.10855   -0.04926 
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 131 rhod31     -3.78445    0.23214  -16.30238 
 132 rhod32     -0.24393    0.12996   -1.87694 
 
Any Unemployment(un): 
 133 cons_un    -0.74671    4.69515   -0.15904 
 134 year        0.06530    0.02525    2.58576 
 135 afqt       -0.00604    0.00101   -5.98804 
 136 readmat    -0.04357    0.05226   -0.83374 
 137 libcard    -0.00557    0.04256   -0.13093 
 138 livpar     -0.04730    0.04267   -1.10830 
 139 prot        0.05083    0.04439    1.14523 
 140 black       0.18790    0.05589    3.36207 
 141 hisp       -0.00868    0.06349   -0.13677 
 142 nc          0.29733    0.08151    3.64801 
 143 so          0.27573    0.10801    2.55272 
 144 we          0.32793    0.10133    3.23614 
 145 urb         0.08488    0.05182    1.63807 
 146 ur          0.06484    0.00735    8.81730 
 147 mw          0.35621    1.06182    0.33547 
 148 mwage      -0.02910    0.04007   -0.72628 
 149 mwhgc       0.04306    0.04101    1.04981 
 150 ugtuit      0.08569    0.42106    0.20352 
 151 expsec      1.28847    0.34161    3.77172 
 152 expps       0.38318    0.18632    2.05657 
 153 age        -0.38773    0.19468   -1.99156 
 154 age2        0.00726    0.00212    3.42409 
 155 exp         0.00083    0.02038    0.04049 
 156 exp2       -0.00013    0.00115   -0.11505 
 157 hgc        -0.20773    0.12884   -1.61228 
 158 dum12y     -0.09233    0.07082   -1.30378 
 159 coldeg      0.01134    0.11492    0.09868 
 160 lag1wu      0.09265    0.00386   23.98149 
 161 lag2wu      0.00411    0.00281    1.46375 
 162 lag3wu      0.00688    0.00274    2.51465 
 163 lag4wu      0.00851    0.00279    3.05033 
 164 lag5wu      0.00302    0.00252    1.19717 
 165 cumtr      -0.05241    0.01995   -2.62756 
 166 year79      0.12579    0.31275    0.40221 
 167 year8082    0.46921    0.14090    3.33015 
 168 year9294   -0.17808    0.09167   -1.94250 
 169 oldcoh      0.10904    0.07092    1.53750 
 170 lag1ch      0.30694    0.08554    3.58822 
 171 lag2ch      0.22186    0.08693    2.55207 
 172 lag3ch      0.12513    0.08415    1.48708 
 173 lag4ch      0.22416    0.09049    2.47731 
 174 lag5ch      0.00448    0.08995    0.04984 
 175 rhod41      1.87575    0.14864   12.61938 
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 176 rhod42     -1.36867    0.10659  -12.84061 
 
Any Job Change (ch): 
 177 cons_ch     4.39813    5.19413    0.84675 
 178 year       -0.00547    0.03051   -0.17931 
 179 afqt       -0.00460    0.00128   -3.58572 
 180 readmat    -0.03884    0.06086   -0.63824 
 181 libcard     0.02831    0.05195    0.54486 
 182 livpar     -0.06131    0.05110   -1.19976 
 183 prot        0.05564    0.05487    1.01414 
 184 black       0.19311    0.06956    2.77607 
 185 hisp        0.04618    0.07570    0.61012 
 186 nc          0.08828    0.10065    0.87706 
 187 so          0.03647    0.13019    0.28009 
 188 we          0.13910    0.11870    1.17189 
 189 urb         0.06088    0.06629    0.91851 
 190 ur          0.04999    0.00893    5.59698 
 191 mw         -0.15158    1.06520   -0.14231 
 192 mwage      -0.00485    0.03991   -0.12158 
 193 mwhgc       0.03470    0.04340    0.79968 
 194 ugtuit     -0.36683    0.54402   -0.67430 
 195 expsec      0.44405    0.41192    1.07800 
 196 expps      -0.28266    0.22398   -1.26197 
 197 age        -0.33359    0.20315   -1.64209 
 198 age2        0.00643    0.00223    2.89025 
 199 exp         0.00292    0.02412    0.12115 
 200 exp2       -0.00092    0.00124   -0.74296 
 201 hgc        -0.16177    0.13824   -1.17021 
 202 dum12y     -0.09284    0.08463   -1.09706 
 203 coldeg      0.05012    0.14111    0.35518 
 204 lag1wu      0.01654    0.00236    7.01810 
 205 lag2wu      0.00645    0.00245    2.63323 
 206 lag3wu     -0.00361    0.00247   -1.46429 
 207 lag4wu      0.00527    0.00267    1.97501 
 208 lag5wu      0.00010    0.00248    0.04087 
 209 cumtr      -0.01271    0.02598   -0.48897 
 210 year79     -1.87776    0.28855   -6.50768 
 211 year8082    0.04009    0.13133    0.30531 
 212 year9294   -0.12556    0.10816   -1.16090 
 213 oldcoh     -0.06027    0.09013   -0.66868 
 214 lag1ch      0.17112    0.07020    2.43763 
 215 lag2ch      0.10180    0.08085    1.25909 
 216 lag3ch      0.25839    0.07755    3.33208 
 217 lag4ch      0.24215    0.08722    2.77629 
 218 lag5ch      0.17742    0.09300    1.90765 
 219 rhod51      1.77302    0.18589    9.53822 
 220 rhod52     -0.98839    0.12069   -8.18933 
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Annual Hours Work (h, Conditional on Working): 
 221 cons_hw  3732.28816  959.17900    3.89113 
 222 year      -17.08248    7.64238   -2.23523 
 223 afqt        0.91746    0.31697    2.89449 
 224 readmat   -17.59887   17.79130   -0.98918 
 225 libcard    -9.01697   14.17603   -0.63607 
 226 livpar     49.54895   15.13751    3.27326 
 227 prot       -1.21263   13.91489   -0.08715 
 228 black     -94.30124   18.05057   -5.22428 
 229 hisp      -31.05630   19.69059   -1.57722 
 230 nc        -32.60257   22.34989   -1.45873 
 231 so         18.17003   27.16728    0.66882 
 232 we        -10.92480   25.86992   -0.42230 
 233 urb       -51.91571   13.25442   -3.91686 
 234 ur        -17.19556    1.63393  -10.52406 
 235 mw       -163.06607  192.18122   -0.84850 
 236 mwage      -1.58275    7.32497   -0.21608 
 237 mwhgc      13.85266    7.48268    1.85130 
 238 ugtuit    322.02056  102.98940    3.12673 
 239 expsec    -59.09172   78.00897   -0.75750 
 240 expps     -39.11304   45.31896   -0.86306 
 241 age        54.30585   35.77315    1.51806 
 242 age2       -1.81219    0.37444   -4.83976 
 243 exp       112.38616    4.71022   23.86007 
 244 exp2       -2.60099    0.17962  -14.48028 
 245 hgc        11.62469   23.61971    0.49216 
 246 dum12y    -12.82351   20.41242   -0.62822 
 247 coldeg     56.21566   32.23167    1.74411 
 248 lag1wu     -6.13522    0.55146  -11.12538 
 249 lag2wu      1.48764    0.56054    2.65397 
 250 lag3wu      1.30891    0.55155    2.37315 
 251 lag4wu      1.39288    0.55675    2.50183 
 252 lag5wu      1.24083    0.53497    2.31943 
 253 cumtr      25.07666    4.79220    5.23280 
 254 year79    -80.94356   51.77019   -1.56352 
 255 year8082 -110.73201   24.69076   -4.48475 
 256 year9294   54.12616   19.64162    2.75569 
 257 oldcoh     44.50441   23.64567    1.88214 
 258 lag1ch   -115.63616   16.58982   -6.97031 
 259 lag2ch    -34.60553   16.23511   -2.13152 
 260 lag3ch    -26.36610   18.11034   -1.45586 
 261 lag4ch     12.13116   19.14107    0.63378 
 262 lag5ch     35.69885   21.25885    1.67925 
 263 sdhw      464.13570    2.79081  166.30857 
 264 rhoc11  -1558.49060   32.12707  -48.51019 
 265 rhoc12    150.36015   32.08095    4.68690 
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Annual Weeks of Unemployment (wun, Conditional on 
Unemployment): 
 266 cons_wu    -1.21723   37.19787   -0.03272 
 267 year       -0.01714    0.21620   -0.07927 
 268 afqt       -0.02301    0.00927   -2.48110 
 269 readmat    -0.18629    0.39441   -0.47232 
 270 libcard    -0.02405    0.36048   -0.06672 
 271 livpar     -0.71227    0.33642   -2.11722 
 272 prot        0.51331    0.37418    1.37183 
 273 black       1.22613    0.46920    2.61321 
 274 hisp        0.82405    0.52764    1.56176 
 275 nc          0.79769    0.69494    1.14785 
 276 so         -1.02733    0.92372   -1.11216 
 277 we         -1.23083    0.87079   -1.41346 
 278 urb        -0.05863    0.44295   -0.13236 
 279 ur          0.39704    0.05794    6.85263 
 280 mw          1.46456    7.39617    0.19802 
 281 mwage      -0.07298    0.30176   -0.24184 
 282 mwhgc       0.08580    0.30575    0.28061 
 283 ugtuit     -6.08689    4.00414   -1.52015 
 284 expsec     -1.87526    2.93697   -0.63850 
 285 expps       1.00824    1.69214    0.59584 
 286 age         0.12530    1.59188    0.07871 
 287 age2        0.00457    0.01806    0.25292 
 288 exp         0.23105    0.17888    1.29165 
 289 exp2       -0.00871    0.01266   -0.68788 
 290 hgc        -0.49446    1.00435   -0.49232 
 291 dum12y      0.47143    0.56712    0.83127 
 292 coldeg      0.70045    1.14054    0.61414 
 293 lag1wu      0.14474    0.01425   10.15383 
 294 lag2wu      0.02528    0.01519    1.66455 
 295 lag3wu      0.03026    0.01570    1.92667 
 296 lag4wu      0.00138    0.01576    0.08732 
 297 lag5wu      0.02328    0.01595    1.45945 
 298 cumtr      -0.34769    0.18970   -1.83286 
 299 year79     -0.49721    1.78280   -0.27890 
 300 year8082    1.93042    0.80413    2.40063 
 301 year9294    0.14282    0.81495    0.17525 
 302 oldcoh     -1.01979    0.60431   -1.68753 
 303 lag1ch     -0.19298    0.44556   -0.43312 
 304 lag2ch     -0.61154    0.50298   -1.21583 
 305 lag3ch     -0.63270    0.58094   -1.08910 
 306 lag4ch      0.25363    0.62387    0.40655 
 307 lag5ch      0.50435    0.64186    0.78576 
 308 sdwun       9.03644    0.13109   68.93370 
 309 rhoc21     12.51703    1.35019    9.27057 
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 310 rhoc22     -3.14764    0.90937   -3.46135 
 
Log of Hourly Average Earnings (w): 
  311 cons_lnw   -0.79345    0.70452   -1.12624 
 312 year       -0.01642    0.00547   -3.00415 
 313 afqt        0.00359    0.00022   16.03136 
 314 readmat     0.03431    0.01343    2.55570 
 315 libcard     0.02460    0.01048    2.34703 
 316 livpar     -0.02949    0.01067   -2.76306 
 317 prot       -0.04015    0.01080   -3.71902 
 318 black      -0.07863    0.01386   -5.67332 
 319 hisp       -0.00597    0.01487   -0.40132 
 320 nc         -0.14034    0.01366  -10.27481 
 321 so         -0.12452    0.01249   -9.96872 
 322 we         -0.06747    0.01377   -4.89873 
 323 urb         0.08424    0.01000    8.42671 
 324 ur         -0.00811    0.00130   -6.24792 
 325 mw          0.07405    0.14320    0.51712 
 326 mwage       0.00351    0.00553    0.63577 
 327 mwhgc      -0.00968    0.00640   -1.51177 
 328 age         0.13150    0.02625    5.00916 
 329 age2       -0.00267    0.00028   -9.43860 
 330 exp         0.06732    0.00409   16.46816 
 331 exp2       -0.00160    0.00018   -9.06741 
 332 hgc         0.07907    0.02086    3.78987 
 333 dum12y     -0.04068    0.01550   -2.62389 
 334 coldeg      0.09227    0.02476    3.72709 
 335 lag1wu     -0.00177    0.00040   -4.45569 
 336 lag2wu     -0.00126    0.00038   -3.32614 
 337 lag3wu     -0.00115    0.00040   -2.88001 
 338 lag4wu     -0.00081    0.00042   -1.90704 
 339 lag5wu      0.00024    0.00042    0.57447 
 340 cumtr       0.03255    0.00358    9.08066 
 341 year79      0.13989    0.04227    3.30958 
 342 year8082    0.04067    0.02026    2.00760 
 343 year9294   -0.00968    0.01594   -0.60745 
 344 oldcoh     -0.01013    0.01783   -0.56847 
 345 lag1ch     -0.03192    0.01211   -2.63596 
 346 lag2ch     -0.00084    0.01253   -0.06680 
 347 lag3ch     -0.00270    0.01371   -0.19669 
 348 lag4ch     -0.00832    0.01371   -0.60640 
 349 lag5ch      0.01062    0.01428    0.74410 
 350 sdlnw       0.33642    0.00175  192.79140 
 351 rhoc31      0.73388    0.02455   29.89510 




Initial Schooling Level in 1979 (is): 
 353 cons_ini   -5.70145    3.87557   -1.47113 
 354 mohgc       0.01863    0.00690    2.69980 
 355 fahgc       0.01844    0.00574    3.21460 
 356 sibnum     -0.02429    0.00653   -3.72103 
 357 rbne        0.08320    0.08732    0.95281 
 358 rbnc        0.29234    0.09655    3.02799 
 359 rbso        0.02224    0.07750    0.28698 
 360 rbwe        0.22578    0.09657    2.33795 
 361 r14ne       1.02708    0.09308   11.03479 
 362 r14nc       0.78330    0.09515    8.23262 
 363 r14so       1.03586    0.08045   12.87626 
 364 r14we       1.10845    0.09235   12.00222 
 365 afqt        0.01262    0.00071   17.72058 
 366 readmat     0.19703    0.04181    4.71209 
 367 libcard     0.14383    0.04112    3.49746 
 368 livpar      0.05846    0.03765    1.55274 
 369 prot        0.06035    0.04388    1.37546 
 370 black       0.26490    0.04969    5.33104 
 371 hisp        0.11269    0.06146    1.83346 
 372 ugtuit      1.49251    0.63685    2.34358 
 373 expsec     -0.47857    0.32260   -1.48349 
 374 expps      -0.01924    0.18976   -0.10141 
 375 age         1.01264    0.43514    2.32714 
 376 age2       -0.01145    0.01230   -0.93044 
 377 age1415    -0.66638    0.18732   -3.55745 
 378 age16      -0.37201    0.11488   -3.23832 
 379 age17      -0.10472    0.07952   -1.31691 
 380 sdhgcini    0.92389    0.00732  126.24723 
 381 rhoc41      0.11976    0.13810    0.86726 




POINT     PROB. WEIGHT      MASS POINT 
  
FIRST PERMANENT HETEROGENEITY 
 1           0.02925         0.00000 
 2           0.08027         0.37403 
 3           0.32656         0.60835 
 4           0.44150         0.77702 
 5           0.12242         1.00000 
SECOND PERMANENT HETEROGENEITY 
 1           0.12959         0.00000 
 2           0.35603         0.58521 
 3           0.48150         0.31993 
 4           0.03288         1.00000 
 
NONLINEAR TRANSITORY HETEROGENEITY 
Any Schooling 
 1           0.17477         0.00000 
 2           0.03244         0.02102 
 3           0.01183        -0.12577 
 4           0.42026         0.22717 
 5           0.02763        -0.07135 
 6           0.33308         0.69062 
Any Training   
 1           0.17477         0.00000 
 2           0.03244        -0.00446 
 3           0.01183         0.07182 
 4           0.42026         0.04399 
 5           0.02763         0.05970 
 6           0.33308        -0.05100 
Any Work   
 1           0.17477         0.00000 
 2           0.03244         2.53530 
 3           0.01183        -3.18005 
 4           0.42026        -0.12075 
 5           0.02763         4.94166 
 6           0.33308         0.16036 
Any Unemployment   
 1           0.17477         0.00000 
 2           0.03244        -0.04904 
 3           0.01183        -0.75519 
 4           0.42026        -4.95586 
 5           0.02763        -1.23314 
 6           0.33308        -1.22591 
Any Job Change 
 1           0.17477         0.00000 
 2           0.03244         0.29726 
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 3           0.01183         0.19501 
 4           0.42026        -2.23391 
 5           0.02763        -0.84130 
 6           0.33308       -99.00000 
Hours worked  
 1           0.17477         0.00000 
 2           0.03244      -952.28885 
 3           0.01183       255.23279 
 4           0.42026       398.01243 
 5           0.02763       -76.58800 
 6           0.33308        96.74391 
Weeks Unemployed   
 1           0.17477         0.00000 
 2           0.03244        15.27832 
 3           0.01183        27.98220 
 4           0.42026        21.25957 
 5           0.02763         0.00354 
 6           0.33308        -4.32722 
Log Wage   
 1           0.17477         0.00000 
 2           0.03244         1.25946 
 3           0.01183        -3.60136 
 4           0.42026         0.04553 
 5           0.02763        -1.58095 
 6           0.33308         0.10578 
Initial Schooling Level (no transitory heterogeneity)  
 1           0.17477         0.00000 
 2           0.03244         0.00000 
 3           0.01183         0.00000 
 4           0.42026         0.00000 
 5           0.02763         0.00000 
 6           0.33308         0.00000 
 
ST. DEV. OF FIRST PERMANENT HETEROGENEITY: 0.19800532191946 
ST. DEV. OF SECOND PERMANENT HETEROGENEITY:0.21874620581648 
ST. DEV. OF NONLINEAR TRANSITORY HETEROGENEITY: 
 Equation:   1      St. Dev. :   0.42531946262434 
 Equation:   2      St. Dev. :    4.2893100665523D-02 
 Equation:   3      St. Dev. :    1.0086913177151 
 Equation:   4      St. Dev. :    3.2971649614189 
 Equation:   5      St. Dev. :    57.154377787081 
 Equation:   6      St. Dev. :    316.29440007216 
 Equation:   7      St. Dev. :    14.595081582500 
 Equation:   8      St. Dev. :   0.52774440325561 
 Equation:   9      St. Dev. :  0. 
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